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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3)U).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
I.

First Issue: Did Axia's fees motion, filed after the district court entered its
summary judgment order, render the Jensens' original notice of appeal premature?

II.

A.

Standard of Review. Not applicable. This issue arose on appeal.

B.

Preservation. Not applicable. This issue arose on appeal.

Second Issue: Did Uintah County's 1995 through 1999 general assessments of the
property include the entire fee interest where the mineral interest was not
separately taxed until 2012, thereby resulting in the sale of the mineral interest in
the 2000 tax sale?
.t

A.

Standard of Review. This issue presents questions of constitutional and
statutory interpretation, namely Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah
Constitution and Utah's Property Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. Title 59,
Chapter 2 (the "Act"), and is therefore reviewed for correctness. Riggs

v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 2015 UT 17, 'II 7,345 P.3d 1219.
B.

III.
..<iJ

Preservation. This issue was preserved by briefing below. (R.1004).

Third Issue: Did the mineral estate pass in the 2000 tax sale where the 1995 tax
lien attached to the property as a matter of law on January 1, 1995, before the
mineral estate was severed from the surface?
A.

Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of statutory
interpretation of the Act, and is therefore reviewed for correctness.

5

Riggs, 2015 UT 17, err 7.
B.

IV.

Preservation. This issue was preserved by briefing below. (R.1008).

Fourth Issue: Does the operative statute of limitations bar all challenges, even
challenges on due process grounds, to the 2000 tax sale?
A.

Standard of Review. This issue presents questions of constitutional and
statutory interpretation, namely Amendment XIV of the United States
Constitution and Utah Code § 78B-2-206, and is therefore reviewed for
correctness. Riggs, 2015 UT 17, err 7.

B.

v.

Preservation. This issue was preserved by briefing below. (R.1011).

Fifth Issue: Does the term "ore", as used in Utah Code§ 40-1-12, include oil and
gas?
A.

.t

Standard of Review. This issue presents a question of statutory
interpretation, namely Utah's Mining Claims Act, Utah Code§§ 40-1-1
to -12, which is reviewed for correctness. Riggs, 2015 UT 17, err 7.

B.

Preservation. This issue was preserved by briefing below. (R.69).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following determinative provisions are included in Addenda 1 to 4,
respectively:

•

Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution .

•

Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution.

•

Cited sections of the Utah's Property Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. Title 59,

Chapter 2.
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•

Utah Code Ann.§ 40-1-12 .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
This case began on July 3, 2013, when Appellees James Harvey Jordan et al. (the

"Jordans") filed a lawsuit against Appellants Eddie and Ly-Thi Jensen (the "Jensens") to
quiet title to the mineral rights on the property at issue in this case. (R.l). On August 9,

~

2013, the Jensens filed their answer and asserted a number of counterclaims against the
Jordans, including claims for declaratory judgment, quiet title, trespass, conversion, and
wrongful removal of ores based on Utah Code§ 40-1-12. (R.23).
The Jordans filed a motion to dismiss related to the Jensens' wrongful removal of
ores claim on August 23, 2013. (R.49). They argued that the term "ore" as used in§ 40-1.

_.t

12 does not include oil and gas and, therefore, that the Jensens failed to state a claim. (R.5354). The district court granted the Jordans' motion and dismissed the Jensens' claim for
•-.ii)

wrongful removal of ore in an order signed November 13, 2013 (the "Dismissal Order").
(R.166).
Subsequently, the Jensens filed a Third-Party Counterclaim on December 12, 2013,
against Appellee Axia Energy LLC. (R.175). The Counterclaim asserted claims for
declaratory judgment, quiet title, trespass, conversion, and, for purposes of preservation,

~

wrongful removal of ores against Axia and certain other purported interest holders. (See
generally R.175-87). The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

(R.257,289,539). On February 18, 2015, the district court entered its Ruling and Order (the
"SJ Order") granting the Jordans' and Axia's motions for summary judgment and denying
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the Jensens' motion for partial summary judgment. (R.1816). A copy of the SJ Order is
®

attached as Addendum 5.
The Jensens timely filed a notice of appeal on March 5, 2015. Axia filed a motion
for attorneys' fees with the district court the day before. (R.1972). Axia then filed a motion
to dismiss the Jensens' appeal, arguing that the appeal was premature in light of Axia's
unresolved fees motion. After the parties fully briefed Axia's motion to dismiss, this Court
entered an order on June 12, 2015, deferring the motion "until plenary presentation on the
merits" and requesting "that the parties separately address the jurisdictional issue in their
briefs on the merits."
Subsequently, on July 10, 2015, the district court entered its Final Order on Motion
.. t

for Attorney Fees, which denied Axia's request for fees. (R.2037). The district court's
order states that it "is the final ruling and order in this case to the extent [the SJ Order] was
rendered non-final." (R.2040-41). The Jensens filed a second notice of appeal on July 28,
2015 to preserve their appeal rights in the event this Court determines that the first notice
of appeal was premature. The Jensens then filed a motion to consolidate the two appeals
on the grounds that the parties and issues are identical. This Court granted the Jensens'
motion and consolidated the appeals on August 20, 2015.

II.

Statement of Facts.

A.

The Jordans' Chain of Title and Delinquent Taxes.

The Jordans' predecessors in interest-Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson, and
Caroline Kelley-acquired both surface and mineral rights to 160 acres of land in Uintah

8

County, 40 acres of which constitute the property at issue in this case (the "Property"), 1
~

by a warranty deed dated October 25, 1954. (R. 234, 1044). They then severed the mineral
rights associated with the Property (the "Mineral Rights") by conveying the surface of the
160 acres to Jonathan Anthony Andrews by a warranty deed dated February 3, 1995,
excepting the minerals rights from the deed. (R.235,1046). Their attorney in the transaction
was appellee James Harvey Jordan, who, as an Oregon real estate attorney, understood
general legal concepts like record notice, constructive notice, statutes of limitation, and tax
liens. (R.1021, 1022). He also understood that property owners must be vigilant and that
ignorance of the law is not a defense. (R.1021).
Uintah County assessed taxes against the Property each year from 1990 through
1999 in the amounts set forth in the f ~llowing table:
Year

Net Taxes
Assessed
$38.37
$40.52
$44.58
$43.59
$47.39
$41.99
$32.42
$35.92
$36.04
$88.61

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
viJ

(R.251 ). No other taxes were assessed against the Property during the years 1995 to 1999;
that is, there were no separate or central assessments related to the Property. (R.229-

1

The Property is more particularly described as the NE¼NE¼ of Section 32,
Township 7 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian.
9

30,480).
The taxes assessed against the Property in 1995 went unpaid until November 17,
1997, and even that 1997 payment was insufficient to fully pay the penalty, interest, and
taxes owing. (R.248,254, 1025). The unpaid balance remained unpaid until it was paid with
the proceeds from the May 25, 2000 tax sale. (R.248,254). Although property taxes were
paid for 1996 and 1997, the taxes assessed against the Property for 1998 and 1999 also
went unpaid until they were paid with the proceeds from the May 25, 2000 tax sale.
(R.230,248,254 ).
Between 1995 and the commencement of this lawsuit, neither the Jordans nor their
predecessors paid any taxes on the Property. (R.1055). Moreover, between 1995 and 2011,
neither the Jordans nor their predecessors filed a statement for the Property with the Utah
State Tax Commission (the "Commission") pursuant to Utah Code § 59-2-207 or
requested a notice of assessment of the Property pursuant to§ 59-2-310. (R.1055).
In 1997, Olivia Jordan conveyed by warranty deed her remaining interest in the
Mineral Rights to Mr. Jordan and his sisters, Martha Jordan Boright and Mary Edna Jordan.
(R.235). Mr. Jordan again prepared the warranty deed on behalf of Olivia Jordan but took
no action to verify that taxes associated with the Property had been paid before
recommending that Olivia sign the warranty deed. (R.1028).
Caroline Kelley and Marie Robertson passed away in December of 2000 and 2002,
respectively. Their heirs now claim an interest in the Property. (R.2). None of the Jordans
has ever visited the Property. (R. l 022).

10

B.

The Jens ens' Chain of Title.

Uintah County sold the Property to Quality Remediation Service Inc. ("QRS") in
the May 25, 2000 tax sale to satisfy the unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest owing since
1995, and conveyed the Property by tax deed (the "Tax Deed"). (R.1078). A copy of the
Tax Deed is attached as Addendum 6. The Tax Deed contains no express reservations or
exceptions.
On December 13, 2000, QRS conveyed the Property to the Jensens by warranty
deed. (R.1080). Like the tax deed, the warranty deed contains no express reservations or
~

exceptions. At the time the Jensens purchased the Property from QRS, there were no fences
anywhere on the Property, and to date there are no fences on the Property. (R.1091-92).
The
., Jensens paid all taxes assessed against the Property for the years 2000 to 2011 .
(R.521).
C.

The Jordans' Leases and Axia 's Oil Production.

In early 2003, many of the Jordans executed instruments purportedly leasing oil and
gas rights in the Property to Landco Energy, Inc. ("Landco"). (R.1028; see e.g. R.1151).
Mr. Jordan did nothing to investigate title to the Property, but the leases nevertheless
warranted title to Landco. (R. l 029).
In May of 2011, the Jordans executed leases of their claimed oil and gas rights in
v)

the Property to Stonegate Resources, LLC ("Stonegate") and again warranted title without
investigating county records. (R.1030-31, 1155). Stonegate executed an assignment of the
leases to Axia on August 1, 2011, reserving an overriding royalty interest for itself and,
following an additional assignment, Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC. (R.1191).

11

On or about November 3, 2011, the Jensens and Axia executed a Surface Use
Agreement and Grant of Easements (the "Surface Agreement"). (R.1306). The Surface
Agreement states that "the initial well to be drilled from the surface by [Axia] shall be into
mineral interest wholly or partially owned by [the Jensens]." (R.1307).
On June 27, 2012, Axia submitted its initial application to drill to the Utah Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining. (R.1217,1319). And on November 13, 2012, Axia received a title
opinion from its attorney relating to the Property. (R.1225,1321). The opinion recognized
that the Jensens have a "possible mineral interest" and recommended that Axia "obtain a
protective lease" from the Jensens. (R.1329). But Axia began producing oil from the
Property on November 23, 2012, without any lease from the Jensens. (R.1219,1331).
attorney.
On March 1, 2013, Axia obtained a second title opinion from . another
_.t
(R.1244,1333). Like the previous one, the new opinion recognized that "there is still a
question as to whether the mineral estate ... passed under the Tax Deed" and recommended
that Axia "obtain a protective lease" in the event that the Jensens make a claim to the
Mineral Rights. (R.1334).
Axia informed the Jordans of the Jensens' claim to the Mineral Rights on or about
March 18, 2013. (R.236). This was the first notice the Jordans received regarding any
problem with their title. (R.236).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The central issue in this case is whether the May 2000 Tax Deed included the
Mineral Rights. Based on the timeline described above and depicted in Addendum 7 and
controlling law, including the Act, the Tax Deed included both surface and mineral
estates. The district court ruling to the contrary is based on, among others, the following
erroneous premises: unproductive mineral rights, an interest in real property, is akin to
intangible property; county assessors' treatment of mineral rights impacts how the Act
should be interpreted; and a due process claim based on insufficient notice has a perpetual
shelf life.
As an initial matter, Axia's challenge to this appeal's timeliness is contrary to Rule
7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the SJ Order was final when entered. Axia' s
cursory request for attorney fees in its Answer, similar to most answers, was insufficient
to require award or denial of fees before final judgment. Indeed, Axia' s position in this
'viJ

regard would create confusion and, as it did in this case, require waste of judicial and party
resources on duplicative appeals. Regardless, because the Jensens filed a protective appeal
that has been consolidated with this case, the jurisdiction of this Court is certain.
On the merits, title to the Mineral Rights passed under the Tax Deed on two
independent and sufficient bases: (1) the Mineral Rights were presumptively assessed as
part of the general assessment until 2012 and the Tax Deed tracks the scope of the
assessment, and (2) the lien for the 1995 taxes and the assessment on which it was based
were effective under the Act as of January 1, 1995-before severance of the surface and
mineral rights-and the Tax Deed tracks the scope of the tax lien. First, the Utah
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Constitution requires assessment of all nonexempt property, and property not required to
be centrally assessed by the Commission is conclusively presumed to be included within
the county assessor's general assessment. The Act requires central assessment of oil and
gas rights

only where the Commission has

notice of commercially viable

production. Because such notice occurred for the Mineral Rights in 2012, the general
assessments from 1995-1999 and, consequently, the Tax Deed included the Mineral Rights.
Alternatively, the Act provides for a January 1st lien and valuation date, which was
before mineral severance in 1995. But the district court held that the date of assessment
and levy controls. The levy date is significant for tax rate, exemption, and revenue
allocation determinations, but the Act is explicit that property "shall be assessed ... on the
basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1[,]" and the related tax lien "shall attach
.

. .t

on January 1 of each year." Thus, the 1995 assessment covered and lien attached to the
entire estate held by the Jordans' predecessors on January 1, 1995, which included the
Mineral Rights. Consequently, the Tax Deed based on that lien also included the Mineral
Rights.
Because the Tax Deed included the Mineral Rights, and because more than four years
has passed since the deed was recorded, the J ordans cannot challenge the Tax Deed. The
legislature passed a special four-year tax title statute of limitations, Utah Code section 78B2-206 ("Section 206"), to promote certainty and clarity of tax titles. But the district court
refused to apply Section 206, holding that insufficient notice voids a tax deed, due process
prevents application of Section 206, and applying Section 206 would be fundamentally
unfair. In contrast, this court has concluded that failure of notice renders a tax deed
14

voidable, not void. Further, while the issuance of a tax deed without sufficient notice
~

violates due process, applying Section 206 after four years to bar a notice-based challenge
does not. Finally, there is no fundamental fairness exception to Section 206, and if there
were, the Jordans' assumptions of no taxes and clear title in the face of record notice to the
contrary obviates any fairness concern. Thus, Section 206 bars any challenge to the Tax
Deed, and this Court should reverse the district court with instructions to quiet title to the
Mineral Rights in the Jensens.
In addition to the main tax title issues before the Court, the district court also incorrectly
interpreted Utah Code section 40-1-12 (the "Ore Statute"). The district court determined
that the term "ore" in the Ore Statute does not include oil and gas. But the Ore Statute was
passed in 1898 as part of Utah's Mining Claims Act, which implemented the state's r9le __ ,
under the federal Mining Law of 1872 (the "Mining Law"). The definitions of ore in thencontemporary and industry-specific dictionaries are broad enough to include oil and gas,
and the Mining Law included oil and gas within its scope when the Ore Statute was passed.
Accordingly, the legislature intended that the term ore encompass all valuable minerals,
including oil and gas.

ARGUMENT
Under the Act, Utah Code, Title 59, Chapter 2, and based on the documents recorded
against the Property, the Jensens own the Property, including the Mineral Rights. In ruling
to the contrary, the district court misapprehended the Act, the Utah Constitution, and the
special tax title statute of limitation. As further discussed below, (I) this Court has
jurisdiction; (II) the Mineral Rights were assessed as part of the general assessment until
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2012 and were therefore sold with the tax sale; (III) the tax lien for 1995 attached on
January 1, 1995, before severance of the Mineral Rights, so the tax sale based on that lien
included the Mineral Rights; (IV) the applicable statute of limitation bars the Jordans from
challenging the tax sale; 2 and (V) the 1898 legislature included oil and gas within the
meaning of the term "ore" in the wrongful removal statute.

I.

This Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Jensens' Appeal.
The SJ Order was either final when entered or it became final upon the district

court's denial of Axia's fees motion on July 10, 2015. In either case, because the Jensens
timely filed appeals upon entry of both orders, which appeals were subsequently
consolidated by this Court, the question of the Court's jurisdiction is moot. See McBride v.
Utah State Bar, 20 IO UT 60,

CJ{

13, 242 P.3d 769 ("An issue is moot when the requested

_.t

judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

If the Court decides to address Axia's motion, however, the Court should deny it because:
(1) the SJ Order was substantively and procedurally final; (2) recent case law clarifies that

subsequent motions do not change the status of a final order; and (3) Axia's position would
only confuse the question of finality.
A.

The SJ Order was Substantively and Procedurally Final.

A final order has both substantive and procedural components: Substantively, an
order is final "when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant." Salt Lake City

Parts II and III provide the grounds for determining that the Tax Deed included the
Mineral Rights, and either of these Parts provide an independent basis establishing the
Jensens ownership of the Mineral Rights. Part IV establishes that the time for challenging
the Tax Deed passed long before the J ordans filed this case.
2
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Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979). Procedurally, a substantively final order
~

"triggers the appeal period" only if it complies with Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure as follows: "( 1) the court approves an order submitted with an initial
memorandum, (2) the court directs that no additional order need be entered, or (3) a party
prepares an order for entry that is consistent with the court's final decision." Giusti v.
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, CJI 35, 201 P.3d 966. This Court has recognized that,

"[e]ither an order must be submitted by the prevailing party or the court must give the
parties explicit direction that no order is required." Code v. Utah Dep't. of Health, 2007
._;;

UT 43,

CJI

6, 162 P.3d 1097. Indeed, a court must explicitly state whenever "it intends a

document . .. to constitute its final action." Giusti, 2009 UT 2, CJ{ 30.

The SJ Order was final under the above standard.. At..tthe time of entry, there were
no further claims or motions of any nature left to be resolved, and Axia did not mention its
intention to seek attorneys' fees in any of the filings associated with the competing
VliJ)

summary judgment motions. Further, the SJ Order stated that "the parties are notified that
this is the final ruling and order in this case" and that "[t]he parties need not prepare or
submit any other order." (R.1832). The SJ Order was therefore a final appealable order and
thus triggered the appeal period.
B.

Subsequent Motions Do Not Alter the Status of Final Orders.

Recent case law clarifies that motions filed subsequent to a final order do not alter
finality. See Migliore v. Livingston Fin., LLC, 2015 UT 9, CJ{ 14, -- P.3d --. In Migliore, this
Court granted certiorari to consider whether an appeal from an order denying a renewed
rule 60(b) motion was timely. Id. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after
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entry of an order denying the 60(b) motion but within thirty days from a subsequent order
awarding attorneys' fees. Id. '1I 11. This Court recognized that, as part of the order denying
the 60(b) motion, the district court sua sponte ordered the petitioner to show cause as to
why he did not violate Rule 11 in filing the motion. Id. '1I'1I 9, 16. As a result, this Court
concluded that "the order denying the renewed rule 60(b) motion was not final and
appealable until the district court finally resolved the pending order to show cause." Id. '1I
18. In so doing, the Court made two points relevant to the current dispute: First, because
the order to show cause precluded final judgment, the "subsequent request for attorney fees
is best characterized as a prejudgment request for fees," and "a prejudgment request for
attorney fees must be resolved prior to the entry of a final appealable order." Id.

<JI

18 n.2

(emphasis added). Thus, this Court clarified that Loffredo applies to prejudgment requests
for fees, not fee requests filed subsequent to a final order.
Second, the Court stressed that "[a] judgment that is final and appealable when
entered does not lose that status as a result of a subsequently filed motion for rule 11
sanctions," id. '1I 20 n.3, which the Court compared to requests for attorneys' fees, id. '11'1I
19-20. The Court's decision applies to "requests for rule 11 sanctions raised before or
contemporaneously with the entry of a final appealable judgment." Id. (emphasis added).

Given the above, the SJ Order, which was final and appealable when entered, did not lose
that status as a result of Axia's subsequent motion for fees.
C.

Dismissal of the Jensens' Appeal Would Add Confusion to the Determination
of Finality and Thereby Defeat the Purpose of Rule 7(f)(2).
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This Court has repeatedly stressed that the purpose of requiring an explicit statement
~

of finality like the one included in the SJ Order is to remove confusion about the time
period for appeal. Cent. Utah Conservancy Dist. v. King, 2013 UT 13, <JI 14, 297 P.3d 619;
Code, 2007 UT 43, <JI 6. The SJ Order was final when entered and thus triggered the time

period for appeal. Axia filed its fees motion after the SJ Order on March 4, 2015. And
while Rule 4 extends the time for appeal for certain motions, Utah R. App. P. 4(b), it does
not cover Axia's motion for fees pursuant to Rule 73(a). Thus, if Axia's motion defeated
finality, the Jensens would be faced with the scenario of a ticking time period for appeal
~

with no clear rule to toll that time period. Had the Jensens failed to appeal when they did,
they would undoubtedly be defending a motion to dismiss their appeal as untimely rather
than as premature. This is_ the_rvery scenario Rule 7 is intended to prevent. Accordingly,
this Court should determine that the Jensens properly appealed the SJ Order.
II.

Without Separate Assessment until 2012, the General Assessment Included
Surface and Mineral Estates, Which Therefore Passed in the 2000 Tax Sale.
Although the Utah Constitution requires that all nonexempt property be assessed,

the district court ruled that the Mineral Rights were neither included in Uintah County's
-..iJ

general property assessment nor assessed by the Commission. But (A) under the Utah
Constitution, the Act, and important policy considerations, the assessments included the
Mineral Rights; and (B) other states with similar statutory frameworks have held that the
general taxes cover all real property interest not actually separately assessed, and resulting
tax sales likewise include all such interests.
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A.

The Mineral Rights Passed by the Tax Deed Because the Act, in accord with
the Utah Constitution, Requires General Assessment of Oil and Gas Rights
until Actual Production.

Because the Act and the Utah Constitution require that all nonexempt property be
assessed and taxed, because the county is obligated to assess everything not required to be
assessed by the Commission, and because the Commission did not tax any mineral interest
in the Property until at least 2012, Uintah County's general tax assessment of the Property
from 1995 to 1999 included both the surface and mineral estate components of the
Property. Determination of the scope of assessment is critical because a tax deed cannot
convey more or less than the estate assessed. See Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah
1946). As discussed below, (1) the Constitution and the Act allocate assessment authority
so that all nonexempt property is assessed and taxed, (2) the text of the Act establishes that
.t

the general assessment presumptively includes nonproductive minerals, and (3) policy
considerations support this assessment allocation.
1.

The Utah Constitution and the Act Require that All Non-exempt
Mineral Rights Be Assessed and Taxed.

Under Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, "all tangible property in the
State that is not exempt. .. shall be" assessed and taxed. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore,
Utah Code section 59-2-301 provides that "[t]he county assessor shall assess all property
located within the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the commission."
In other words, to comply with the constitutional mandate, all property not assessed by the
Commission is assessed by the county assessor.
But the district court concluded that "undeveloped or undiscovered minerals
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underlying a piece of property are akin to an intangible asset," (R.1825), that "fall[s]
~

outside the scope of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, and are not subject
to taxation." (Id.) The district court offered no legal support for this conclusion, and there
is none. Indeed, Utah Code section 59-2-102(33)(b) defines real property to include "all
mines [and] minerals ... in and under the land." Furthermore, this Court held in Salt Lake
City Southern Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission that even an easement-an

interest in real property less tactile than mineral rights-is tangible property. 1999 UT 90,
<JI

~

12, 987 P.2d 594. Thus, the conclusion that nonproducing mineral rights are intangible

property, a foundational aspect of the district court's order, is reversible error.
In reality, there is no need to stretch the concept of intangible property because the
text of the Act prevents any gap in assessment for nonproducing mineral rights. The Act

.t

requires that nonproducing oil and gas interests be assessed by the county assessor as part
of the general property assessment. Under Utah Code section 59-2-201, the Commission
is obligated to separately assess "all mines and mining claims." A mine is defined by the
Act as "a natural deposit of either metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable mineral." Id.
§ 59-2-102(24) (emphasis added). Thus, where there is a valuable mineral deposit, the

Commission is obligated to assess its value and forward that assessment to the county to
levy the associated taxes. Id. Contrast that provision to the Act's definition of "real
property," which includes "all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land." Id. §
59-2-102(33). In other words, all minerals are part of the real property subject to tax (by
general assessment of the county), but "valuable" mineral deposits are to be separately
assessed by the Commission.
21

The district court nevertheless gave weight to testimony by the county assessor that
assessments do not include mineral rights. This was legal error. 3 Indeed, this Court has
determined that, even in the face of contrary testimony from the assessor's office, the
correct scope of assessment is "conclusively presumed." Hayes, 169 P.2d at 786. Thus, if
the law required the assessor to include the value of Mineral Rights in its general
assessment, then the assessor is conclusively presumed to have done so. And whether the
county assessor is conclusively presumed to have included the Mineral Rights within the
Property's general assessment or the Commission was to have done a separate assessment
of the Mineral Rights depends on the meaning of "valuable" in the Act.
2.

The Commission Was First Required to Assess the Mineral Rights in
2012 When They Became Valuable Based on Production.

Although the word "valuable" is arguably subject to

a range of meanings,

the

intended meaning in the Act can be determined based on the text of the Act in connection
with the meaning of "valuable" in mineral development. Utah Code section 59-2-201
requires the Commission to assess "all mines and mining claims." Mining claims arise
under the Mining Law and are limited to minerals originally located on federal land. 30
U.S.C.§ 22. A "mine," in contrast, is any "natural deposit of ... valuable mineral." Utah
Code. Ann. § 59-2-102(24 ). The qualification of "valuable" in the definition of "mine"
results in consistency with the minerals associated with mining claims. Specifically, the
validity of a mining claim depends on discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit[]." 30

Given the conclusive presumption, the 2013 assessor's lack of personal knowledge
as to the 1995 assessment, and the affidavit's internal contradictions and legal errors, the
district court's reliance on the Rolene Rasmussen Affidavit in any respect was error.
3
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U.S.C.§ 22 (emphasis added). A "valuable mineral deposit[]" for this purpose requires that
"a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor
and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine." Castle

v. Womble, 19 LD 455 (1894); accord U.S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599,601 (1968).
For a discovery of a valuable deposit of oil and gas, when it was still subject to
the Mining Law, a claimant was required to have more than the mere "possibility that the
ground contained oil," and a claimant who observed a spring with some oil flowing to the
surface was held insufficient to constitute a discovery of a valuable mineral deposit.

Chrismann v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313, 323 (1905). Axia has acknowledged that it did not
"know how well this property would produce," and that drilling on the Property in 2012
was "highly exploratory." (R.1218). Thus, it was not until 2012 that the Mineral Rights
could be identified as "valuable."
Consistent with this interpretation, the Commission has promulgated Rule R884·\/!)

24P-10 of the Utah Administrative Code. In that rule, the event that triggers assessment by
the Commission (i.e., the point when oil and gas is deemed valuable for assessment
purposes) is production. See, e.g., UTAH ADMIN. CODE R884-24P-10(C)(2) ("The taxable
value of underground oil and gas rights shall be determined by discounting future net
revenues to their present value as of the lien date of the assessment year"). Indeed, as a
practical matter, the only way that the Commission would know about a valuable oil and
gas interest on a particular property is reported production of oil and gas from the property
or a notice of such oil and gas rights under Utah Code section 59-2-207. Neither occurred
before 2012 for the Property. (R.1217). Ultimately, the term "valuable" must at least
23

contemplate a threshold that puts the Commission on notice of a property's reasonable
prospect of profitable mineral development.
But the district court read the word "valuable" out of the Act, assuming that valuable
means anything not worthless. (R.1825). A court must interpret a statute such that each
term has meaning and no term is rendered superfluous. Grappendo,f v. Pleasant Grove
City, 2007 UT 84, <JI 9, 173 P.3d 166. Indeed, the court's assertion that "[v]alueless property

cannot be taxed" illustrates the logical fallacy of defining "valuable" as the opposite of
"valueless," because with that interpretation, the application of the Act to minerals would
be exactly the same with and without the term "valuable." Further, the court's interpretation
would result in nonproducing mineral rights, whether severed or not, never passing by tax
sale because even the most common mineral has some value in holding up the surface. Said
.

. .t

another way, most tax sales would actually create a severed estate where the delinquent
owner retained the minerals. Such a result would put ownership of mineral rights in doubt
for any property that has been the subject of a tax sale at any point in its history. (R.1244.)
Finally, the district court's interpretation of "valuable" results in a significant class of
property-nonproducing mineral rights-escaping assessment and taxation-a result that
is directly contrary to the Utah Constitution. See Part II.A. I. Assessors and the Commission
can only act based on available information, and cannot prognosticate that heretofore
unknown reserves will become economically viable years in the future. Accordingly, the
law conclusively presumes that the general assessment includes nonproducing mineral
rights not separately assessed.
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3.

Policy Considerations Support the Jensens' Plain Reading of the
Act.

The district court recites a parade of practical problems from the plain language
reading, but the statute addresses these concerns and policy considerations actually support
the plain reading of the statute. The district court, in essence, accepts a strained reading of
the Constitution and Act based on the county's assumed practices. The district court asserts
that ( 1) "[b]ecause Uintah County does not notify owners of severed mineral interests of
assessments or tax sales, it is likely that many owners of severed mineral interests find
themselves in an identical position to the Jordans;" (2) in the case of severed minerals, "the
county's general assessment results in only one tax bill even though there are at least two
owners[,]" and that bill is "uniformly assessed to and paid by the surface owner;" and (3)
~

taxing unproductive minerals creates questions about who among surface and severed
mineral owners is obligated to pay a singular tax bill and how the bill would be split.
(R.1825). First, the court's role should be to interpret the law as passed, not accept strained
readings to avoid a result that, in the court's judgment, would be undesirable. Second,
"[t]he law is not founded on mistakes." Hayes, 169 P.2d at 786. In other words, even if
counties generally do not provide the requisite notice to mineral owners, such failure does
not change the law so that notice and payment of taxes are no longer required. Third, while
payment and allocation issues as between surface and mineral owners may arise in the
future, this Court cannot circumvent the text of the Act to avoid those issues.
Ultimately, following the Constitution's inclusive taxing requirement gives both
surface and mineral owners incentive to make sure taxes are paid. Otherwise, they could
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lose their respective interests m a tax sale. In contrast, under the district court's
interpretation, the mineral owner gets a free ride with no obligation to ensure taxes are
paid. Indeed, as discussed further in Part IV .C.2, the district court's ruling would obviate
any need for a nonproducing mineral owner to monitor the county record to ensure its
interest is not sold. And if it were sold, the mineral owner could wait indefinitely before
they or their successor challenged the tax sale for failure of notice. Such a laissez-faire
conception of a mineral owner's responsibility is antithetical to the complex and inclusive
property tax regime created by the Act to secure tax revenue to local governments. Thus,
presumptively including nonproductive mineral rights within the general property
assessment not only conforms with the plain language of the Act and Constitution, it also
supports the policy of securing tax revenue to the government by establishing the certainty
.

.t

and finality of tax deeds.

B.

Other States with Similar Statutes Have Held that Mineral Rights Not
Separately Assessed Pass with a Tax Sale Based on a General Assessment.

Although no Utah case has specifically interpreted how mineral rights not separately
assessed should be treated in a tax sale, cases from other jurisdictions have held consistent
with the analysis in Part II.A. New York State Natural Gas Corp. v. Swan-Finch Gas

Development Corp., 173 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. Pa. 1959), illustrates the very principles at
issue. In that case, there were two separate assessments: the assessment of the coal and the
general tax assessment, both of which resulted in tax sales. The issue in the case was who
owned the gas interest following the tax sales. The court first noted that, like the Property,
there had been no separate assessment of the gas interest. Id. at 186. It further noted that
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there was no obligation to separately assess the gas because "[t]here was no basis for
believing that there was actually gas under [the property] ... until" a producing well was
drilled in the immediate vicinity of the property. Id. Given these facts, the court held that,
where the general assessment at issue was not expressly limited to anything "less than all
property rights in the land," the assessment included all property not separately assessed.
Id. Consequently, the tax sale based on the general property taxes passed title to the gas

interest. Id.
Other states have likewise held that a tax deed conveys the entire estate, including
severed mineral rights, unless the mineral rights are separately assessed. For example, in
Oklahoma, "[w]here there is no mineral production from the land, the mineral interest goes
with the surface by a resale tax deed." Three-in-One
Oil
& Gas v. Bradshaw, 135 P.2d 992,
.
_.t
993 (Okla. 1943). Similarly, in California, where there is "no separate assessment of ...
oil rights, and as the assessments of the balance of the fee showed no reduction ... because
of the separate ownership of those oil rights, we must conclude that the assessed valuation
placed on the properties by the assessor included the assessed valuation of the oil rights."
McCracken v. Hummel, 110 P.2d 700, 702 (Cal Ct. App. 4 th 1941). Indeed, as with the

present case, "[a]ny other conclusion would have to be based on the assumption ... that
the assessor failed to perform his duty and failed to assess taxable property situated within
his county." Id. Accordingly, the court held that the tax deed included the severed mineral
interest. Id.
Against this legal background, the 1995, 1998, and 1999 assessments against the
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Property were general assessments of the entire fee interest, both surface and mineral. 4
First, the Commission did not separately assess any mineral interest in the Property until
at least 2012. Before 2012, the mineral rights associated with the Property were not
"valuable" within the meaning of the Act and were therefore taxed with the general real
property tax on the Property. Second, the assessments and Tax Deed said nothing to suggest
that the assessment included "less than all property rights in the land." Because the general
assessment included both the surface and mineral estates until oil and gas production began
in 2012, the resulting tax sale in 2000 likewise sold the entire fee estate. Accordingly, the
district court erred in ruling that the unproductive mineral interest in this case fell outside
the general assessment.

III.

The Mineral Estate Passed Because the 1995 Tax Lien Attached on January 1,
1995, Before Severance of the Mineral Estate.
Regardless of whether general property taxes include severed-but-nonproducing

mineral estates, the 1995 taxes, on which the tax sale was based, were assessed as of
January 1st, before severance of the surface and mineral estates, and therefore included the
entirety of the Property. The district court ruled that "[b]ecause the property was not
assessed by the Uintah County assessor until after the February 3, 1995, severance date,
the mineral estate was not assessed by the County." (R.1823). According to this ruling,
"Uintah County only assessed the surface rights," and the "tax lien did not attach to the

The district court assumed based on Telonis v. Staley, 144, P.2d 513, 515 (Utah
1943 ), that severance of the minerals requires separate assessment of mineral and surface.
But that case is based on an express requirement of the Act at the time. The separate
assessment requirement was, however, removed from the Act in 1989, six years before the
1995 assessment. See 1989 Utah Laws 536, 537.
4
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mineral rights." (Id.). As discussed below, these conclusions are in error because (A) the
~

Legislature carefully identified the critical dates in assessment and lien attachment, (B)
there is no exception for post-lien severance of mineral rights, and (C) a mistake in the date
stated on the Record of Delinquent Taxes does not have any effect on the lien date.
A.

The Act and Case Law Establish that a Tax Lien Attaches on January 1.

The district court focuses on the date of assessment and levy, but the Act is explicit
as to both effective assessment date and lien date. Whether assessed by the county assessor
or the Commission, the Act requires that "all tangible property located within the state shall
be assessed and taxed ... on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January l ."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-2-103 (emphasis added). Similarly, the assessor is required to

"assess the property to the owner ... at 12 o'clock midnight of January 1 in the tax year."
.

. .t

Id. § 59-2-303 (emphasis added). If a property is conveyed to a new owner between January
1st and 14 days before the tax notice is mailed, the "tax notice may be mailed, and the tax
assessed, to the new owner," but "[n]o mistake in the name or address of the owner or
supposed owner of property renders the assessment invalid." Id. (emphasis added). In other
words, the county has discretion to send notices to the new owner, but the validity or scope
of the assessment is unaffected by any conveyance.
Consistent with the valuation and ownership determination dates, the Act expressly
provides that "[a] tax upon real property is a lien against the property assessed ... [and]
shall attach on January I of each year." Id. § 59-2-1325 (emphasis added). Utah courts
have confirmed that under the Act, "ad valorem tax must be assessed to the owner of the
property on January 1st and that a valid, enforceable lien exists as of that date regardless
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of any transfers of ownership that might occur prior to subsequent assessment and levy."
Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 380 P.2d 924, 925 (Utah 1963). The only exception to this

rule-applicable only when the grantee "enjoy[s] tax-exempt status"-does not apply here
because the Jordans predecessors were not exempt from property taxes. Id. Thus, the
Property was valued as the unsevered fee estate that existed on January 1, 1995; the
property tax lien attached to the Property as it existed on January 1, 1995; and the resulting
tax sale based on the 1995 tax lien necessarily conveyed the Property to the same extent
assessed and liened-including both surface and mineral estates.
The New Mexico Supreme Court faced an almost identical set of facts in Sawey v.
Barr. 198 P.2d 801 (N.M. 1948). In that case, Barr received a deed for mineral rights in

1929 but did not record it until May of 1931. Id. at 801. Before the mineral deed was
recorded, "the property became subject to assessment for the 1931 taxes, the lien of which
attached as of January 1, 1931." Id. Because the 1931 taxes were not paid and no
redemption made, the property was conveyed by tax deed in the spring of 1937. Id. at 80102. In determining whether the lien attached to, and the sale included, both surface and
mineral rights, the court held as follows:
As we see the case, while the mineral rights were not and could not be assessed,
the whole property, including the mineral rights, being owned by the tax debtor
at the time of the filing of the tax rolls, was affected by the resulting lien and
legal mortgage and became security for the payment of the taxes. As the tax sale
was but a legal enforcement and consummation of this lien and mortgage, the
rights of the tax purchaser dated back to the time it attached to the property, and,
unless otherwise invalid, conveyed the mineral rights. It seems to us clear that,
if the tax debtor could not have transferred the whole property, after the attaching
of the lien and mortgage so as to defeat them, he could not legally transfer such
a part of them as the mineral rights have been held to be. We therefore concluded
that the tax sale, if valid, conveyed a complete title.
30

.,

Id. at 803 (quoting Barthold v. Dover, 153 So. 49 (La. App. 1934)). Thus, as in Sawey,

even if later assessments did not include mineral rights, the lien nevertheless attached
to the entire property such that the Tax Deed conveyed both surface and mineral
rights.
B.

There Is No Exception to the Lien Attachment Date for Post-lien Mineral
Severance.

Despite the above law, the district court created a new exception to the statutory lien
date that would apply when severance of minerals occurs after the lien date. The district
court cites Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974), to support its
exception, but that case does not apply. In that case, over a strong dissent, the Court
concluded that a transfer of property to a tax-exempt entity after the lien date but before
_.t

assessment and levy of taxes resulted in no tax lien. Id. at 1248-49. The Huntington Court
viewed the case of Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County as "controlling" because Huntington
City, like Cedar City in the Utah Parks case, "was a tax exempt municipal corporation."
Id. at 1249. The Utah Parks case leaves no doubt as to the basis of its decision, stating that

"[i]n reaching this conclusion, . . . the controlling feature is not the mere change of
ownership, but rather a change of ownership which has the effect of converting property
from a taxable status to that of nontaxable." 380 P.2d at 926.
Neither Huntington City nor Utah Parks prevents attachment of the tax lien on
January 151• In Gillmor v. Dale, 75 P. 932 (Utah 1904), this Court held that "a city tax does
not become a lien on real estate until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied, but when
the rates is so fixed, the amount determined and levied, a lien ... attaches ... 'as of [January
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1st]' preceding the levy." Gillmor, 75 P. at 934. The existence and effective date of a tax
lien is thus confirmed by Gillmor, and Gillmor holds only that the amount of taxes and to
whom they are paid depends on the levy date rather than the lien date. Utah Parks takes
the Gillmor reasoning one step further in concluding that, because taxes cannot be levied
against a municipality, the levy must be zero. Utah Parks Co., 380 P.2d at 925-26. Finally,
Huntington City took the final step to recognize that there can be no tax lien where the tax

levied must be zero.
This logical progression has no application to the present facts. 5 Taxes cannot be
levied against property owned by a municipality because the Constitution and the Act
provide municipalities an exemption from property taxes. Utah Const. art. XIII, § 3; Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-1101. In contrast, a mineral severance does not convert mineral rights
.

_.t

"from a taxable status to that of nontaxable." Utah Parks Co., 380 P.2d at 926. Rather, as
discussed above, a mineral interest is a tangible property right included within the
definition of "real property" under the Act. Id. § 59-2-102(33). Nothing in the Act even
suggests that reservation of minerals somehow exempts that real property interest from
taxes. The Jordans claim only that the Mineral Rights should have been assessed by the
Commission. But regardless of whether the county assessor or the Commission is
responsible for assessment, the taxable character of the property cannot be disputed. Thus,

West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 852 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1993), is likewise
inapplicable. West Valley confirms that the lien date is January pt but establishes that the
levy date "is the relevant point for determining whether West Valley or the County should
receive the ad valorem taxes for the entire 1988 tax year." 852 P.2d at 1003. But the entity
entitled to tax revenue is not at issue in the present case.
5
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because the mineral rights were at all times subject to taxation, and because the effective
date of the assessment and lien was January Pt, the lien attached to the full Property,
including the Mineral Rights.
C.

The Lien Date Is Unaffected by a Mistake on the Record of Delinquent Taxes.

The district court's final basis for disregarding the statutory lien date is that a Record
of Delinquent Taxes lists an incorrect lien date. (See, e.g., R.1823). But the tax lien attaches
to real property by operation of law and is not evidenced by any recorded document. UTAH
CODE ANN.§

59-2-1325. Furthermore, although the county is required to maintain a record

of delinquent taxes, the Act does not require that it be recorded or that it recite a lien date.
Id. § 59-2-1338. Here, the Record of Delinquent Taxes, which incorrectly stated a tax lien

date of January 16, 1996, was recorded on May 25, 2000, the date of the tax sale. The
Jordans never investigated whether there were delinquent taxes or clouds on their claimed
mineral title, so they certainly did not rely on a document recorded in 2000 as the reason
they did not pay taxes in 1995. 6 Accordingly, the legally incorrect recitation of the lien date
in the Record of Delinquent Taxes simply lacks any legal or factual significance in this
case.
Ultimately, the May 25, 2000 Tax Deed passed the entire Property, including the
Mineral Rights. The assessment of the Property in 1995 was based on the fair market value
of the Property as it existed on January 1, 1995, before the mineral severance in February

6

Any alleged reliance would also be of no effect in this case because the county,
the only entity against which the Jordans could have asserted various equitable doctrines,
is not a party to this case.
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of that year. The lien for unpaid general taxes on the Property attached on January 1, 1995.
The 1995 general taxes were not paid until the May 25, 2000 tax sale. The 2000 tax sale
was based on the 1995 delinquency. And no document in the tax record contains any
statement that would limit the assessment, lien, or sale to anything "less than all property
rights in the land." New York State Natural Gas Corp. 173 F. Supp. at 186. Taken together,
these facts establish that both surface and mineral rights in the Property passed by the Tax
Deed to Quality Remediation Services and then to the Jensens. Accordingly, the district
court erred in ruling that the tax lien did not attach to the Mineral Rights as of January 1,
1995.

IV.

G,

Section 206 Bars Any Challenge to the May 2000 Tax Sale.
Where the mineral rights passed in the May 25, 2000 tax sale, Section 206 protects
.• t

the Jensens' tax title from any challenge after four years from the date of the tax sale. 7 As
discussed below, Section 206 bars the Jordans' challenge because (A) the Jensens have
satisfied the requirements of Section 206; (B) the county's failure to give the Jordans notice
rendered the Tax Deed voidable during the limitations period, but the Jordans did not
timely seek to void the Tax Deed; and (C) application of Section 206 does not violate the
Due Process Clause.

7

There are two statutes of limitation that protect tax sales, Sections 78B-2-205 and
78B-2-206. These provisions are nearly identical. While both sections protect the Jensens'
tax title in this case, the Jensens reference only Section 206 for ease of analysis.
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A.

The Jensens Have Satisfied the Requirements of Section 206.

Section 206 bars the Jordans' claim because the Jensens have held tax title for much
longer than the statutory period, and the Jordans cannot establish possession within the
statutory period. Section 206 provides:
An action or defense to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or determine
the ownership of real property may not be commenced against the holder of
a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale,
conveyance, or transfer of the tax title to any county, or directly to any other
purchaser at any public or private tax sale. This section may not bar any
action or defense by the owner of the legal title to the property which he or
his predecessor actually occupied or possessed within four years from the
commencement of an action or defense ....
As discussed below, to gain the protection of Section 206, the Jensens need only show that
( 1) they have held tax title beyond the four years following the tax sale, and (2) the Jordans
did not actually possessed the minerals during the same four-year statutory I5eriod.
1.

Section 206' s Four-Year Limitations Period Has Expired

There is no dispute that the Jensens hold tax title to the Property and have held it for
well beyond the four-year period specified in Section 206. Parts I and II above establish
that the Jensens' title includes the Mineral Rights. Section 206 bars a would-be challenger
to tax title even where the underlying tax sale is invalid. Section 78B-2-101(2) defines "tax
title" to mean "any title to real property, whether valid or not, which has been derived
through, or is dependent upon, any sale, conveyance, or transfer of property in the course
of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of any tax levied against the property."
(Emphasis added.) Consistent with this definition, this Court held that parties "may avail
themselves of [Section 206] regardless of either the invalidity of their tax title or their
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inability to establish an affirmative claim to title apart from their tax title." Frederiksen v.
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah 1981) (footnote omitted). Thus, in Frederiksen, Section

206 barred any challenge to tax title even though the tax sale "was conducted by an
unqualified officer" and was therefore procedurally invalid. Id. at 828. The court
accordingly held that defendants were "immune from attack on the validity of their tax
title." Id. at 832. Having held tax title to the Property, including Mineral Rights, far beyond
2004, the Jensens have satisfied the requirements of Section 206, which now bars all
"action[s] or defense[s] to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or determine the
ownership of' the Mineral Rights unless the Jordans actually possessed the Mineral Rights
within the four-year statutory period required by Section 206.
2.
.• t

The Jordans Did Not Possess the Mineral Rights During the
Limitations Period

The Jordans cannot show possession of the Mineral Rights within the statutory
period. The district court concluded, sua sponte, "that the Jordans exercised as much actual
possession or control of the mineral estate as possible, by periodically leasing the minerals
over the many years following the tax sale." (R.1826 n.3). The district court stretched the
concept of actual possession based on the perceived "inequality the statute would create
for owners of legal title to unproductive mineral estates, as they would never be able to
show actual possession of an unproductive mineral estate." (Id.). But this Court has refused
to read "actual possession" out of Section 206 and has definitively outlined the bounds of
the possession exception to Section 206. Dye v. Miller & Viele, 587 P.2d 139, 142-43 (Utah
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1978). 8 Indeed, the Dye Court held that actual possession of mineral rights under a parcel
Gi>

requires actual production of minerals from that parcel. Id.; see also Kanawha & Hocking
Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon Cnty., 535 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1975) (requiring "acts of

dominion over the minerals" to constitute possession); Payne v. Williams, 414 N.E.2d 836,
841 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("Acts of dominion entail, at the very least, actual removal of the
minerals .... "). Thus, the mere leasing of minerals, which is the most the Jordans can
show, falls far short of the possession required by Section 206.
Utah cases likewise make clear that the exception to Section 206 for actual
@

possessors of property sold in a tax sale applies only if possession occurred during the four
years immediately after the tax sale. In Dye, the defendants argued that Section 206 did not
bar their attempt to quiet title to minerals sold
years earlier in a tax sale as long as "there
.
.t
ha[ d] been actual occupancy or possession any time, however brief, and however obtained,
within four years from the initiation of the challenge." Dye, 587 P.2d at 141. The court

\id

disagreed, noting that Section 206 is "obviously intended to lay at rest claims against tax
titles which are asserted more than four years after acquisition of a tax title under statutory
proceedings, and where the record owner has not had possession during that period." Id. at
142 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants' argument, the court noted, would
"defeat the entire purpose of a statute that [is] designed to settle, not confuse, and to make
certain, not uncertain, titles based on statutory liquidation of tax charges." Id. (internal

8

Dye actually analyzes earlier versions of Sections 205 and 206, which were
previously codified as 78-12-5.1 and -5.2 respectively. Because these earlier versions do
not differ in any material way, the Jensens reference Section 206 to maintain consistency.
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quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court held that defendants' challenge was
barred because they "had not been in actual possession any time during the four years
following the tax deed." Id.
Applying Dye and Frederiksen to this case, Section 206 bars any challenge to the
Jensens' tax title, including the Jordans' notice argument, unless the Jordans actually
possessed the Property during the four years following the tax sale-May 2000 to May
2004. But between 2000 and 2004, the Jordans never visited the Property; there were no
fences on the Property; and there was no oil or gas production on the Property. Indeed,
Axia has confirmed that "[t]he only improvements to the Property are those that Axia
caused to be installed," (R.300), and this did not occur until 2012 at the earliest, (R.1217).
That is eight years too late. Consequently, the district court's conclusion that the Jordans
possessed the Mineral Rights is erroneous, and Section 206 bars the Jordans claim to the
Property.
B.

A Tax Deed Valid on Its Face but Issued without Proper Notice Is Not Void
but Voidable within the Limitations Period.

Notwithstanding the facial applicability of Section 206 to this case, the district court
ruled that Section 206 is not effective in this case because the "tax deed is void" for lack
of sufficient notice to the Jordans. (R.1828). The court based its decision on two cases:
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), and Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah

1981). But neither of these cases address whether a tax deed issued in Utah without proper
notice is void or merely voidable. The SJ Order assumes that failure of notice voids the
Tax Deed, (R.1828), but Utah law provides otherwise. As discussed below, ( 1) in Utah, a
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tax deed is void only if facially invalid or by reason of fraud, but insufficient notice renders
~

a tax deed voidable; and (2) this law is consistent with other Western states, like Colorado,
where insufficient notice merely makes a tax deed voidable.
1.

Insufficient Notice Does Not Void a Tax Deed in Utah.

The failure of sufficient notice with respect to the tax sale resulted in the opportunity
during the limitations period for the Jordans to have the sale declared void. In other words,

the Tax Deed was voidable. This Court in Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955),
excluded only a deed "not valid on its face or ... not issued by the proper governmental
authority" from application of Section 206. In that case, defendants attacked the validity of
the Tax Deed and application of the statute of limitations based on, among other things, a
violation of due process. Id. The court rejected these arguments, upheld the statute of
.

.t

limitation as constitutional, and barred defendants' claim. Id. at 886. The court stated:
In holding [Section 206] valid, we can see no merit in any argument to the
effect that if any of the statutory steps necessary to perfect a tax title have not
been taken, such as failure to give notice of sale ... compels the conclusion
that title remains in the record owner, hence no title passes, hence any claim
by the county and/or its grantee by tax deed is invalid, hence the statute of
limitations does not apply. The same argument could be leveled against other
statutes of limitation where the authorities have validated a situation where
one becomes the owner absolute of the property of another, without
conveyance of any kind, but merely as an adjunct of the passage of time and
the performance of statutorily prescribed conditions.
Id. (emphasis added). As to the validity of procedurally defective tax deeds, the court stated

the controlling rule as follows:
[W]e do not wish it understood that our decision is applicable to conveyances
void on their face, such as those containing no grantor, grantee, description,
etc, or to those that may be forged or the like, but only to those valid on their
face, as here, and executed by the same authority that could have passed good
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title if each and every statutory step ... had been followed, without the aid
of a limitations statute.

Id. at 887. Thus, Section 206 is ineffective only where the tax deed is invalid on its face.
Kemmerer Coal Co. v. Brigham Young University, 723 F.2d 54 (10th Cir. 1983)
further demonstrates that lack of actual notice does not void a tax deed. In that case,
Kemmerer claimed that the tax deed was void for lack of notice. Id. at 55. The Tenth
Circuit, applying Utah law, rejected this claim because Kemmerer lacked standing to bring
the due process claim. Id. at 57. If the Tax Deed were void, then any claimed successor,
such as Kemmerer could, at any time, quiet title without regard to Section 206 or any other
statute of limitations. See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 'Il 20, 144 P.3d 1129. Thus,
the only way that the holding of Kemmerer Coal Co. makes sense is if failure of notice
renders a tax deed voidable rather than void.

.t

Ultimately, although the Jensens concede that the County failed to give sufficient
notice of the tax sale-a basis of attack explicitly rejected in Hansen-the Tax Deed is
facially valid. The deed includes a grantor, grantee, a description of the property, and, had
the County followed all necessary steps, it could have passed good title to the mineral rights
without the aid of Section 206. 9 Accordingly, even assuming lack of notice, the Tax Deed
is not void.

9

Whether minerals are centrally assessed by the Commission or assessed by the
assessor, tax collection is conducted by the County, and "[t]he county auditor ... [,] in the
name of the county, execute[s] deeds conveying" property sold at a tax sale. Utah Code
Ann.§ 59-2-1351.1; see also id.§ 59-2-1308 ("Property taxes assessed by the commission
shall be collected, billed, and paid in the manner provided for ... other general property
taxes ....").
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2.

Utah's Law is Consistent with Colorado's Distinction between Void
and Voidable Tax Deeds.

Like Utah, Colorado does not void tax deeds for lack of notice. In Lake Canal
Reservoir Co. v. Beethe, 227 P.3d 882 (Colo. 2010), the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed

a statute of limitations similar to Section 206. There, the petitioners brought suit to quiet
title and void a tax deed based on, among other things, inadequate notice. Id. at 883. The
trial court found that the county "did not serve notice on numerous parties who occupied
[the property] or on parties with a record interest, and omitted the property's section
number in the published notice." Id. at 885. Due to these and other deficiencies, the trial
court voided the tax deed and quieted title in the petitioners. Id.
But the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, recognizing that "the statute of
r

~

limitations will not apply where the tax deed is void[,]" but "a voidable deed conveys
property and creates legal title unless, and until, it is set aside by the court." Id. at 886-87
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that a "deed is void-and therefore not
subject to the statute of limitations-[ only] when the taxing entity lacked the authority or
jurisdiction to issue it." Id. at 889. It then concluded that, under this rule, "[a]ssuming that
insufficient notice was given, the tax deed ... would be voidable, rather than void" because
lack of notice does not relate to the jurisdiction or authority of the county. Id. at 889-90.
Because the Jensens' deed is valid on its face and the County had jurisdiction and
authority to issue it, insufficient notice did not render the Tax Deed void. Thus, because
the J ordans did not assert their due process claim within four years of the tax sale, their
claim is barred by Section 206.
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C.

Due Process Does Not Prevent Section 206 from Running Against Facially
Valid Tax Deeds, and Applying Section 206 Is Not Fundamentally Unfair.

The district court erred in concluding that application of Section 206 violates due
process or fundamental fairness. Due process does not prevent Section 206 from running
against facially valid tax deeds, and applying Section 206 is not fundamentally unfair to
the Jordans. As a result, the Jordans' cannot challenge the tax sale.
1.

Applying Section 206 to the Jordans' Tax Sale Challenge is Not a
Violation of Due Process.

The district court erroneously focused on whether the Jordans were deprived of due
process by the tax sale, but the issue is whether Section 206's cutting off the Jordans
challenge is itself a violation of due process. It is not. The Jensens concede that the tax sale
in this case did not comply with Jones v. Flowers. In Flowers, Jones failed to pay his
_.t

property taxes, so the State of Arkansas sent notice to the house by certified mail stating
that it would sell the house unless he redeemed his property within two years. Id. at 223.
Jones had separated from his wife, however, and was no longer living at the house. Id.
Nobody was home at the time to sign for the notice, and the notice went unclaimed at the
post office. Id. at 224. The post office then returned the notice to the State as "unclaimed".
~:

Id. Two years later, the State published notice of a public sale and eventually sold the house
to Linda Flowers. Id. Shortly after the tax, Jones filed suit against Flowers and the
Commissioner of State Lands challenging the sale as a violation of his due process right to
notice. Id. The Supreme Court agreed, holding "that when mailed notice of a tax sale is
returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide
notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so." Id. at
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225.
While Flowers would be relevant to determination of whether there was a due
process violation within four years of the sale, it is inapposite to the present dispute. Indeed,

Flowers involved a landowner who timely challenged the tax sale by bringing suit against
both the new owner and the governmental seller. In contrast, the Jordans brought this action
more than a decade after the Tax Deed was recorded and have not included Uintah County
as a party. Thus, Flowers has no relevance to the issue of whether, assuming a due process
violation, Section 206 can bar a claim based on that violation more than four years after
,:::i.
\//Ill

the tax sale.
The rule is well-established that a statute of limitation can bar any right so long as
the limitations period is reasonable. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877);
.t

Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 318 (1900); Swanson v. Pontralo, 27
N.W.2d 21, 25 (Iowa 1947). In Swanson, the pre-tax-sale owner claimed, like the Jordans,
that the statute of limitations worked a deprivation of property without due process. 27
N.W.2d at 24. But the court recognized that the appellant's "property was taken by the tax
deed and the limitation statutes merely prescribe a period within which he must assert any
claim he might have that this deed was ineffectual ...." Id. The court noted further that
"the statute merely cut off a remedy, after a lapse of time, within which time, the claimant
out of possession was free to assert the remedy. Id. Finally, the court concluded that "[s]uch
a statute does not offend against due process if the statute grants a reasonable time within
which process can be had." Id. Simply put, the tax sale took the Property, including the
Mineral Rights, for failure to pay taxes. Section 206 merely cut off the Jordans' right to
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challenge the sale after a reasonable lapse of time. Such a customary statute of limitations
does not offend due process.
2.

Applying Section 206 to this Case is Not Fundamentally Unfair as
Applied to the Jordans.

The district court also relied heavily on dicta from this Court's decision in
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, for the proposition that Section 206 may not apply to "a tax title

acquired by means repugnant to fundamental fairness." 632 P.2d 827, 831 n.14 (Utah
1981 ). As an initial matter, "fundamental fairness" is not a concept separate and apart from
due process. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 880, 883 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (referring
to the "due process mandates of fundamental fairness" (citation omitted)). Thus, the
conclusion above, that Section 206 does not violate due process because it merely cuts off
a remedy after the lapse-E>f time, is likewise a conclusion that application of Section 206 is
not repugnant to fundamental fairness.
But even if there were a judicially created fundamental unfairness exception to
Section 206, this case falls outside that exception. The Jordans had record notice of the tax
sale and, as a result, notice of their alleged due process claim four years before Section 206
expired. See Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-102 (stating recorded documents "impart notice to all
person of the contents"); see also Kemmerer v. Brigham Young Univ., 723 F.2d 54, 58
(1983) (no unfairness where party "bought the coal lands in the face of record notice of a
rival claim"); Shelledy v. Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 790 (Utah 1992) (same). In Helfrich v.
Adams, 2013 UT App 37, 299 P.3d 2, the Utah Court of Appeals stated in the context of

the equitable discovery rule that "[g]iven that the transfers were a matter of public record,
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... [plaintiff] had constructive notice that the transfers had occurred and, through the
~

exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered her claims within the limitations
period[.]" Id. 'ff 12. Indeed, not only did the Jordans have constructive notice, but they also
had reason within the limitations period to check the record. The Jordans warranted title to
mineral rights in leasing their claimed mineral interest in 2003, but they "did nothing to
investigate [their] title" at that time. (R.1029). Accordingly, just as both Kemmerer and
Shelledy could have avoided injury by checking the record, had the Jordans conducted any
research of the record in 2003 (before expiration of the limitations period), they would have

~

seen the unlimited Tax Deed facially based on unpaid taxes for 1995 when they still owned
the Property. Given these facts, like Kemmerer and Shelledy, they were fully empowered
to avoid the injury of which they now complain.
.t

The district court ascribes, however, no significance to the Jordans' record notice,
asserting that it is insufficient under Flowers. 10 (R.1828-29). But the issue is not whether
constructive notice is sufficient in the first instance, it is whether constructive notice is
sufficient to apprise the Jordans of their potential challenge to the tax sale. In Helfrich, the
Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that constructive notice was sufficient to

The district court also asserts that the record notice was misleading based on the
error in the Notice of Delinquency. (R.1828-29). But as discussed in Part 111.C. above, that
error was of no consequence because the deed itself recited 1995 as the tax year at issue,
and the Jordans are deemed to know that the statutory lien date is January 1st of the year
the tax was levied. See North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925)
("All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note
of the procedure adopted by them .... " And "[t]his is especially the case with respect to
those statutes related to taxation and condemnation of land."). For similar reasons, the
district court's reliance on the incorrect legal assertions of a county employee to minimize
the Jordans' obligation to protect their property rights was also in error.
10
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provide that type of notice. 2013 UT App 37,

<JI

12. Indeed, if constructive notice were

insufficient to trigger Section 206, then challenges to tax deeds for failure of notice would
survive indefinitely, and the purpose of the legislature in passing Section 206-providing
certainty to tax titles-would be frustrated.
Ultimately, the Jordans had an open lane for a slam dunk challenge to the Tax
Deed, but they did not even look for the ball and allowed the four-year shot clock to
expire. There is no "repugnan[ce] to fundamental fairness" where the Jordans were given
record notice, made no diligent inquiry to the record despite independent reason to do so,
and assumed without legal basis that their real property right was simply not taxed for
more than a decade. See North Laramie Land Co., 268 U.S. at 283. Thus, even if there
were a fundamental fairness exception to Section 206-an exception that no Utah court

··'
has ever applied-such an exception would not apply to the undisputed facts of this case.

V.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Jensens' Ore Statute Claim Because
the Legislature's Intended Meaning for "Ore" Includes Oil and Gas.
The district court erred in granting the Jordans' motion to dismiss the Jensens' claim

under the Ore Statute. The J ordans' sole argument for dismissal is that they (or their agents)
have extracted oil and gas from the Property rather than ore. (R.53-54.). Accordingly, the
Court must determine whether the term "ore," in the Ore Statute, includes oil and gas.
"When interpreting statutes, [the] goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the
Legislature." Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, <JI 16, 158 P.3d 540 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Courts accomplish this goal "by looking at the best evidence of legislative intent,
namely, the plain language of the statute itself." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The

46

"starting point" for this task "is the dictionary." State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44,
(iii}

<JI

13, 308

P.3d 517 (internal quotation marks omitted). But while a dictionary "provides a historical
record, not necessarily all-inclusive, of the meanings which words in fact have borne," it
will "often fail to dictate what meaning a word must bear in a particular context." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the question of what meaning the legislature
intended a term to bear "will often require further refinement-of selecting the best
meaning among a range of options, based on other indicators of meaning ...." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Jordans relied on a single case from California, which in tum relies on

Webster's Dictionary to define ore as "the compound of a metal and some other substance."
CA LLC, 199 Cal.App.4th 817, 825 (2011)).
(R.54 (quoting Sukut Const., Inc. v.. Rimrock
.,
But other dictionaries, including both industry-specific and time-appropriate dictionaries,
include broader definitions such as "[t]he naturally occurring material from which a
mineral or minerals of economic value can be extracted profitably ...." Dictionary of
Mining, Mineral, & Related Terms 379 (2d ed. 1997); A Standard Dictionary of the English
Language 1240 (Funk et al., eds., 1st ed. 1895) ("The term is applied usually to a mineral
from which a metal can be profitably extracted, but is sometimes extended to non-metallic
materials ...."). Because oil and gas are naturally occurring materials from which a range
of valuable hydrocarbon products can be produced, the term ore could include oil and gas.
Thus, the dictionary fails to indicate what meaning the term ore must bear, and the Court
should look to other indicators to determine the intended meaning. Canton, 2013 UT 44, CfI
13.
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One indicator is "the contemporaneous understanding" of the term ore at the time
of the Ore Statute's passage in 1898. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759
(1980). Utah's Mining Claims Act, Utah Code Ann.§§ 40-1-1 to -12, which includes the
Ore Statute, was enacted to provide for the orderly implementation of its federal
counterpart, the Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-42. The Mining Law allows U.S. citizens
to stake claims on federal lands containing "valuable mineral deposits." 30 U.S.C. § 22. A
"mineral deposit" is defined as "[a]ny valuable mass of ore." A Dictionary of Mining,
Mineral, and Related Terms 710 (Thrush et al., eds., 1968) (emphasis added). And it is
accepted that "whether a substance is metallic or not has no direct bearing on whether it is
a mineral for purposes of the mining law," Michael Braunstein, All that Glitters:

Discovering the Meaning of Mineral in the Mining Law of 1872, 21 Land & Water L. Rev.
297, 303 (1986).
Indeed, the definition of "mineral" under the Mining Law of 1872 looks to whether
"a substance possesses economic value for use in trade, manufacture, the sciences, or in
the mechanical or ornamental arts." United States v. Toole, 224 F. Supp. 440, 445 (D. Mont.
1963) (quoting 1 Lindley, Mines, 3rd ed. 1914, 174-75, § 98, as restated in 2 Am. Law of
mining 171, § 2.4); see also Braunstein, supra, at 304 (same). Congress made clear just
one year before the Ore Statute was enacted that the Mining Act included oil and gas. 29
Stat. 526,526 (1897) (stating "[t]hat any person authorized to enter lands under the mining
laws of the United States may enter and obtain patent to lands containing petroleum or
other mineral oils"); see also Consol. Mut. Oil Co. v. United States, 245 F. 521, 522 (9th
Cir. 1917). Accordingly, at the time of the Ore Statute's enactment, an ore deposit locatable

48

under the Mining Law included oil and gas reserves. 11
The Mining Law's broad definition of a mineral or ore deposit is consistent with the
definition of ore cited above: "[t]he naturally occurring material from which a mineral or
minerals of economic value can be extracted profitably ...." Furthermore, the general
practice in early Utah case law was to construe mining terms broadly. Nephi Plaster &
Mfg. Co. v. Juab Cnty., 93 P. 53, 56 (Utah 1907). Indeed, the Ore Statute repeatedly uses

broad language, such as "any mine or mining claim" and "ores from any mine." (Emphasis
added.) Thus, when the Utah Legislature enacted the Ore Statute in 1898, it intended the
~

term "ore" to include all locatable mineral deposits, including oil and gas reserves.
The Legislature has done nothing since the Ore Statute's enactment in 1898 to alter
the original
broad
definition of ore. While there were additions to the Ore Statute in 1943,
.
.t
these changes were not material to the original intended meaning of ore. Ultimately, if the
Jordans' claimed construction of "ore" were to prevail, it would result in the arbitrary result

vi)

of a party having to pay treble damages for the wrongful, knowing removal of every type
of valuable mineral with the exception of oil and gas. See Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames
Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,

<JI

73, 210 P.3d 263 ("When statutory language plausibly

presents the court with two alternative readings, we prefer the reading that avoids absurd
results." (internal quotation marks omitted)). This Court should therefore conclude that the
meaning of ore intended by the Legislature at the time of the Ore Statute's enactment in

11

Although oil and gas are no longer locatable under the Mining Law, this
subsequent change does not bear on the question of legislative intent at the time of the Ore
Statute was enacted.
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1898-a meaning that has never changed-includes oil and gas. Accordingly, the district
court erred in dismissing the Jensens' claim for wrongful removal of ores.

CONCLUSION
Based on the arguments discussed above, the Jensens respectfully request that the
Court reverse the SJ Order and Dismissal Order and remand the cast to the district court
with directions to (I) enter a judgment quieting title to the Property, including the Mineral
Rights, to the Jensens, and (2) proceed to trial on the Jensens other counterclaims, including
its wrongful removal of ores claim.
DATED this 30th day of September, 2015.

PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

A----~

By:~
Daniel A . ) ~
Terry E. Wekh
Matthew E. Jensen

Attorneys for Appellants Eddie R. & Ly-Thi
Jensen
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Tab 1

AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES ANO ... , USCA CONST Amend ....

United States Code Annotated
Constitution of the United States
Annotated
Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection;
Appo1tionment of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV-Full Text
AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE
PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION;
DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Cu1Tentness

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,>
<see lJSCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Citizens>
<see lJSCA Const Amend. XIV,§ I-Privileges>

Tab 2

Sec. 2. [Property tax], UT CONST Art. 13, § 2

West's Utah Code Annotated
Constitution of Utah
Article XIII. Revenue and Taxation
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 13, § 2
Sec. 2. [Property tax]
Currentness

( l) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible property, all
tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this Constitution shall be:

(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and

(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate.

(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible property owned

or used by the corporation or person within the boundaries of the State or local authority levying the tax.

(3) The Legislature may provide by statute that land used for agricultural purposes be assessed based on its val~e for agricultural
use.

(4) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.

(5) The Legislature may by statute determine the manner and extent of taxing or exempting intangible property, except that any
property tax on intangible property may not exceed .005 of its fair market value. If any intangible property is taxed under the

property tax, the income from that property may not also be taxed.

(6) Tangible personal property required by law to be registered with the State before it is used on a public highway or waterway,
on public land, or in the air may be exempted from property tax by statute. If the Legislature exempts tangible personal property
from property tax under this Subsection (6), it shall provide for the payment of uniform statewide fees or uniform statewide
rates of assessment or taxation on that property in lieu of the property tax. The fair market value of any property exempted
under this Subsection (6) shall be considered part of the State tax base for determining the debt limitation under Article XIV.

Credits
Laws 2002. S.J.R. 10. § 2. adopted at election Nov. 5, 2002, eff. Jan. I. 2003.

Notes of Decisions (204)
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 13, § 2, UT CONST Art. 13, § 2

Tab 3

§ 59·2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59·2-102

(ii)(A) a city or town if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection (9)(a) and the boundaries of the city or
town are identical; or

(B) a special service district if the boundaries of the school district under Subsection (9)(a) are located entirely within

the special service district.

( 10) "Eligible judgment" means a final and unappealable judgment or order under Section 59-2-1330:

(a) that became a final and unappealable judgment or order no more than 14 months prior to the day on which the notice
required by Section 59-2-919.1 is required to be mailed; and

(b) for which a taxing entity's share of the final and unappealable judgment or order is greater than or equal to the lesser of:

(i) $5,000; or

(ii) 2.5% of the total ad valorem property taxes collected by the taxing entity in the previous fiscal year.

( 11 )(a) "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, of any improvements to the property, subject to taxation
and is:

(i) inadvertently omitted from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel, or assessed to the wrong taxpayer by the

assessing authority;

(ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting
requirements of this chapter; or

(iii) undervalued because of errors made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete or erroneous information

furnished by the taxpayer.

(b) Property that is undervalued because of the use ofa different valuation methodology or because ofa different application
of the same valuation methodology is not "escaped property."

( 12) ••Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of
taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in
cases where there is a reasonable probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question
and the change would have an appreciable influence upon the value.
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( 13) "Farm machinery and equipment," for purposes of the exemption provided under Section 59-2-1101, means tractors,
milking equipment and storage and cooling facilities, feed handling equipment, irrigation equipment, harvesters, choppers,
grain drills and planters, tillage tools, scales, combines, spreaders, sprayers, haying equipment, including balers and cubers,
and any other machinery or equipment used primarily for agricultural purposes; but does not include vehicles required to be
registered with the Motor Vehicle Division or vehicles or other equipment used for business purposes other than farming.

(14) "Geothermal fluid" means water in any form at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade naturally present in a
geothermal system.

( 15) "Geothermal resource" means:

(a) the natural heat of the earth at temperatures greater than 120 degrees centigrade; and

(b) the energy, in whatever form, including pressure, present in, resulting from, created by, or which may be extracted from
that natural heat, directly or through a material medium.

( I 6)(a) "Goodwill" means:

(i) acquired goodwill that is reported as goodwill on the books and records:

(A) of a taxpayer; and

(8) that are maintained for financial reporting purposes; or

(ii) the ability of a business to:

(A) generate income:

(I) that exceeds a normal rate of return on assets; and

(II) resulting from a factor described in Subsection (l 6)(b ); or

(8) obtain an economic or competitive advantage resulting from a factor described in Subsection (16)(b).

(b) The following factors apply to Subsection (]6)(a)(ii):

(i) superior management skills;

§ 59¥2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59¥2-102

(ii) reputation;

(iii) customer relationships;

(iv) patronage; or

(v) a factor similar to Subsections ( 16)(b)(i) through (iv).

(c) "Goodwill" does not include:

(i) the intangible property described in Subsection (20)(a) or (b);

(ii) locational attributes of real property, including:

(A) zoning;

(B) location;
.t

(:\
V/iil

(C) view;

(D) a geographic feature;

(E) an easement;

(F) a covenant;

(G) proximity to raw materials;

(H) the condition of surrounding property; or

(I) proximity to markets;

(iii) value attributable to the identification of an improvement to real property, including:

(A) reputation of the designer, builder, or architect of the improvement;

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(B) a name given to, or associated with, the improvement; or

(C) the historic significance of an improvement; or

(iv) the enhancement or assemblage value specifically attributable to the interrelation of the existing tangible property in
place working together as a unit.

( 17) "Governing body" means:

(a) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the county, city, or town;

(b) for a local district under Title 178, Limited Purpose Local Government Entities--Local Districts, the local district's board
of trustees;

(c) for a school district, the local board of education; or

(d) for a special service district under Title 17D, Chapter 1, Special Service District Act:
.t

(i) the legislative body of the county or municipality that created the special service district, to the extent that the coun.ty
or municipal legislative body has not delegated authority to an administrative control board established under Section
170-1-301; or

(ii) the administrative control board, to the extent that the county or municipal legislative body has delegated authority to
an administrative control board established under Section 17D-1-30 I.

( l 8)(a) For purposes of Section 59-2-103:

(i) "household" means the association of persons who live in the same dwelling, sharing its furnishings, facilities,
accommodations, and expenses; and

(ii) "household" includes married individuals, who are not legally separated, that have established domiciles at separate
locations within the state.

(b) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may make rules defining
the term "domicile."

(l 9)(a) Except as provided in Subsection ( 19)(c), "improvement" means a building, structure, fixture, fence, or other item that
is permanently attached to land, regardless of whether the title has been acquired to the land, if:

··~
{
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(i)(A) attachment to land is essential to the operation or use of the item; and

(8) the manner of attachment to land suggests that the item will remain attached to the land in the same place over the
useful life of the item; or

(ii) removal of the item would:

(A) cause substantial damage to the item; or

(8) require substantial alteration or repair of a structure to which the item is attached.

(b) "Improvement" includes:

(i) an accessory to an item described in Subsection ( 19)(a) if the accessory is:

(A) essential to the operation of the item described in Subsection (19)(a); and
.t

(8) installed solely to serve the operation of the item described in Subsection ( 19)(a); and

(ii) an item described in Subsection ( 19)(a) that:

(A) is temporarily detached from the land for repairs; and

(8) remains located on the land.

(c) Notwithstanding Subsections ( l 9)(a) and (b ), "improvement" does not include:

(i) an item considered to be personal property pursuant to rules made in accordance with Section 59-2-107;

(ii) a moveable item that is attached to land:

(A) for stability only; or

(8) for an obvious temporary purpose;

8

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(iii)(A) manufacturing equipment and machinery; or

(B) essential accessories to manufacturing equipment and machinery;

(iv) an item attached to the land in a manner that facilitates removal without substantial damage to:

(A) the land; or

(B) the item; or

(v) a transportable factory-built housing unit as defined in Section 59-2-1502 if that transportable factory-built housing
unit is considered to be personal property under Section 59-2-1503.

(20) "Intangible property" means:

(a) property that is capable of private ownership separate from tangible property, including:

(i) money;

(ii) credits;

(iii) bonds;

(iv) stocks;

(v) representative property;

(vi) franchises;

(vii) licenses;

(viii) trade names;

(ix) copyrights; and

(x) patents;

,t

§ 59-2·102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2·102

(b) a low-income housing tax credit;

(c) goodwill; or

(d) a renewable energy tax credit or incentive, including:

(i) a federal renewable energy production tax credit under Section 45, Internal Revenue Code;

(ii) a federal energy credit for qualified renewable electricity production facilities under Section 48. Intemal Revenue Code;

(iii) a federal grant for a renewable energy property under American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, Section 1603; and

(iv) a tax credit under Subsection 59-7-614(5).

(21) "Livestock" means:

(a) a domestic animal;

(b) a fish;

(c) a fur-bearing animal;

(d) a honeybee; or

(e) poultry.

(22) "Low-income housing tax credit" means:

(a) a federal low-income housing tax credit under Section 42. Internal Revenue Code; or

(b) a low-income housing tax credit under:

(i) Section 59-7-607; or

§ 59~2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59~2-102

(ii) Section 59-10-1010.

(23) "Metalliferous minerals" includes gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, and uranium.

(24) "Mine" means a natural deposit of either metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable mineral.
r.,.·•,

\\li,1'

(25) "Mining" means the process of producing, extracting, leaching, evaporating, or otherwise removing a mineral from a mine.

(26)(a) "Mobile flight equipment" means tangible personal property that is:

(i) owned or operated by an:

(A) air charter service;

(B) air contract service; or

(C) airline; and
.t

(ii)(A) capable of flight;

(B) attached to an aircraft that is capable of flight; or

(C) contained in an aircraft that is capable of flight if the tangible personal property is intended to be used:

(I) during multiple flights;

(II) during a takeoff, flight, or landing; and

(Ill) as a service provided by an air charter service, air contract service, or airline.

(b)(i) "Mobile flight equipment" does not include a spare part other than a spare engine that is rotated:

(A) at regular intervals; and

(B) with an engine that is attached to the aircraft.

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(ii) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may make rules
defining the term "regular intervals."

(27) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, oil, gas, coal, salts, sand, rock, gravel, and all carboniferous
materials.

(28) "Part-year residential property" means property that is not residential property on January 1 of a calendar year but becomes
residential property after January 1 of the calendar year.

(29) "Personal property" includes:

(a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (30) that is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning
of the terms "real estate" and "improvements";

(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys;

(c) bridges and ferries;

(d) livestock; and

.• t

(e) outdoor advertising structures as defined in Section 72-7-502.

(30)(a) "Property" means property that is subject to assessment and taxation according to its value.

(b) "Property" does not include intangible property as defined in this section.

(31) "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means the operating property of a railroad, gas corporation, oil or gas
transportation or pipeline company, coal slurry pipeline company, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage
corporation, or heat corporation where the company performs the service for, or delivers the commodity to, the public generally
or companies serving the public generally, or in the case of a gas corporation or an electrical corporation, where the gas or
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. Public
utility also means the operating property of any entity or person defined under Section 54-2-1 except water corporations.

(32)(a) Subject to Subsection (32)(b), "qualifying exempt primary residential rental personal property" means household
furnishings, furniture, and equipment that:

(i) are used exclusively within a dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant;

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(ii) are owned by the owner of the dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant; and

(iii) after applying the residential exemption described in Section 59-2-103, are exempt from taxation under this chapter
in accordance with Subsection 59-2-1115(2).

(b) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may by rule define the
term "dwelling unit" for purposes of this Subsection (32) and Subsection (35).

(33) "Real estate" or "real property" includes:

(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of land;

(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or
being on the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges appertaining to these; and

(c) improvements.

(34) '"Relationship with an owner of the property's land surface rights" means a relationship described in Subsection 267(b ),
lqternal Revenue Code:

(a) except that notwithstanding Subsection 267(b), Internal Revenue Code, the term 25% shall be substituted for the term
50% in Subsection 267(b ), Internal Revenue Code; and

(b) using the ownership rules of Subsection 267( c), Internal Revenue Code, for determining the ownership of stock.

(35)(a) Subject to Subsection (35)(b), "residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments under this
chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a primary residence.

(b) Subject to Subsection (35)(c), "residential property":

(i) except as provided in Subsection (35)(b)(ii), includes household furnishings, furniture, and equipment if the household
furnishings, furniture, and equipment are:

(A) used exclusively within a dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant; and

(B) owned by the owner of the dwelling unit that is the primary residence of a tenant; and

(ii) does not include property used for transient residential use.

§ 59-2-102. Definitions, UT ST§ 59-2-102

(c) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may by rule define the
term "dwelling unit" for purposes of Subsection (32) and this Subsection (35).

(36) "Split estate mineral rights owner" means a person who:

(a) has a legal right to extract a mineral from property;

(b) does not hold more than a 25% interest in:

(i) the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located; or

(ii) an entity with an ownership interest in the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located;

(c) is not an entity in which the owner of the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located holds more
than a 25% interest; and

(d) does not have a relationship with an owner of the land surface rights of the property where the wellhead is located.
_.t

(37)(a) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" means:

(i) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate or intrastate to transport passengers, freight,
merchandise, or other property for hire; or

(ii) any commercial vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer which operates interstate and transports the vehicle owner's goods or

property in furtherance of the owner's commercial enterprise.

(b) "State-assessed commercial vehicle" does not include vehicles used for hire which are specified in Subsection (8)(c) as
county-assessed commercial vehicles.

(38) "Taxable value" means fair market value less any applicable reduction allowed for residential property under Section
59-2-103.

(39) "Tax area" means a geographic area created by the overlapping boundaries of one or more taxing entities.

(40) "Taxing entity" means any county, city, town, school district, special taxing district, local district under Title 17B, Limited
Purpose Local Government Entities--Local Districts, or other political subdivision of the state with the authority to levy a tax
on property.
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(41) "Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes charged on property, as extended on the assessment roll and may be
maintained on the same record or records as the assessment roll or may be maintained on a separate record properly indexed
to the assessment roll. It includes tax books, tax lists, and other similar materials.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 49; Laws 1987, c. 93, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 3, § 90; Laws 1989, c. 204, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 41. § l: Laws 1990,
c. 212. § 1: Laws 1991, c. 263, § 2; Laws 1992. c. 1, § 198; Laws 1992. c. 223, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 237. § I: Laws 1995, c.
271, § 8. eff. May I. 1995; Laws 1996. c. 170. § 55, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 360, § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 1997; Laws 1998,
c. 264. § 2, eff. May 4. 1998; Laws 1998. c. 290. § I. eff. Jan. 1, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 134. § I, eff. J\,tay 3, 1999; Laws 2000,
c. 61, § 1. eff. May I, 2000: Laws 2002, c. 196, § I, eff. Jan. I, 2003; Laws 2002. c. 240, § I, eff Jan. 1, 2003: Laws 2003, c.
113, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003: Laws 2004. c. 162, § 1. eff. May 3, 2004: Laws 2004, c. 243, § I, eff. May 3, 2004: Laws 2004,
c. 281. § 1, eff. Jan. 1. 2005; Laws 2004, c. 303, § I, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2006, c. 223. § 5, eff. May I, 2006; Laws 2006,
c. 249, § 1. eff. May I, 2006: Laws 2007. c. 107, § 2. eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 234, § I, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws
2007, c. 329, § 417, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 61, § 8, eff. Jan. I, 2009; Laws 2008, c. 231, § 8, eff. July I, 2008: Laws
2008, c. 283, § 1, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 301. § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2009: Laws 2008. c. 360, § 153. eff. May 5, 2008; Laws
2008, c. 382. § 963, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 14, § 1, eff. May 11, 2010: Laws 2012, c. 240, § I. eff. May 8, 2012;
Laws 2013. c. 19, § 1. eff. Jan. 1, 2014: Laws 2013, c. 322, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2014, c. 65, § 2, eff. Jan. I. 2015;
Laws 2014. c. 411. § 17, eff. May 13, 2014: Laws 2015. c. 133. § 1, eff. May 12, 2015: Laws 2015. c. 198, § 1, eff. May 12,
2015; Laws 2015. c. 287, § 6, eff. July I. 2015.

Notes of Decisions (28)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-102, UT ST§ 59-2-102
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of l)nrnment

§ 59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property--Residential property, UT ST§ 59-2-103

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 1. General Provisions

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-103
§ 59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property--Residential property

Currentness
( 1) All tangible taxable property located within the state shall be assessed and taxed at a unifonn and equal rate on the basis of
its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law.

(2) Subject to Subsections (3) through (5) and Section 59-2-l 03.5, for a calendar year, the fair market value of residential
property located within the state is allowed a residential exemption equal to a 45% reduction in the value of the property.

(3) Part-year residential property located within the state is allowed the residential exemption described in Subsection (2) if the
part-year residential property is used as residential property for 183 or more consecutive calendar days during the calendar year
for which the owner seeks to obtain the residential exemption .
•t

(4) No more than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the residential exemption described in Subsection (2).

(5)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(b )(ii), a residential exemption described in Subsection (2) is limited to one primary
residence per household.

(b) An owner of multiple primary residences located within the state is allowed a residential exemption under Subsection
(2) for:

(i) subject to Subsection (5)(a), the primary residence of the owner; and

(ii) each residential property that is the primary residence of a tenant.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 50; Laws 1988, c. 3, § 91; Laws 1991, c. 263, § 3: Laws 1994. c. 310. § 2; Laws 1995, c. 275, § I. eff. ivtay I.
1995; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 60, eff. May 3, 2004: Laws 2004. c. 281. § 2. eff. Jan. 1, 2005; Laws 2014, c. 65. § 3, eff. Jan. I. 2015.

Notes of Decisions (69)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-103, UT ST§ 59-2-103
Current through 2015 General Session.

§ 59-2-201. Assessment by commission--Determination of value ... , UT ST§ 59-2-201

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Assessment of Property
U .CA. 1953 § 59-2-201
§ 59-2-201. Assessment by commission--Determination of value of mining property--

Notification of assessment--Local assessment of property assessed by the unitary method
Currentness
<Section effective until Jan. 1, 2016. See, also, section effective Jan. I, 2016.>

( 1)(a) By May I of each year the following property, unless otherwise exempt under the Utah Constitution or under Part 11,
Exemptions, Deferrals, and Abatements, shall be assessed by the commission at I 00% offair market value, as valued on January
1, in accordance with this chapter:

(i) except as provided in Subsection (2), all property which operates as a unit across county lines, if the values must be
apportioned among more than one county or state;
.t

(ii) all property of public utilities;

(iii) all operating property of an airline, air charter service, and air contract service;

(iv) all geothermal fluids and geothermal resources;

(v) all mines and mining claims except in cases, as determined by the commission, where the mining claims are used for
other than mining purposes, in which case the value of mining claims used for other than mining purposes shall be assessed
by the assessor of the county in which the mining claims are located; and

(vi) all machinery used in mining, all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims.
For the purposes of assessment and taxation, all processing plants, mills, reduction works, and smelters which are primarily
used by the owner of a mine or mining claim for processing, reducing, or smelting minerals taken from a mine or mining
claim shall be considered appurtenant to that mine or mining claim, regardless of actual location.

(b )(i) For purposes of Subsection (1 )(a)(iii), operating property ofan air charter service does not include an aircraft that is:

(A) used by the air charter service for air charter; and

(B) owned by a person other than the air charter service.

§ 59-2-201. Assessment by commission--Determination of value ... , UT ST§ 59-2-201

(ii) For purposes of this Subsection (1 )(b):

(A) "person" means a natural person, individual, corporation, organization, or other legal entity; and

(8) a person does not qualify as a person other than the air charter service as described in Subsection (1 )(b)(i)(B) if
the person is:

(I) a principal, owner, or member of the air charter service; or

(II) a legal entity that has a principal, owner, or member of the air charter service as a principal, owner, or member
of the legal entity.

(2) The commission shall assess and collect property tax on state-assessed commercial vehicles at the time of original registration
or annual renewal.

(a) The commission shall assess and collect property tax annually on state-assessed commercial vehicles which are registered
pursuant to Section 41-1 a-222 or 41-1 a-228.

(b) State-assessed commercial vehicles brought into the state which are required to be registered in Utah shall, as a condition
of registration, be subject to ad valorem tax unless all property taxes or fees imposed by the state of origin have been paid
for the current calendar year.

(c) Real property, improvements, equipment, fixtures, or other personal property in this state owned by the company shall
be assessed separately by the local county assessor.

(d) The commission shall adjust the value of state-assessed commercial vehicles as necessary to comply with 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 14502, and the commission shall direct the county assessor to apply the same adjustment to any personal property, real
property, or improvements owned by the company and used directly and exclusively in their commercial vehicle activities.

(3) The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining property is the capitalized net revenue method
or any other valuation method the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's satisfaction, to be
reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the mining property. The rate of capitalization applicable to mines shall
be determined by the commission, consistent with a fair rate of return expected by an investor in light of that industry's current
market, financial, and economic conditions. In no event may the fair market value of the mining property be less than the fair
market value of the land, improvements, and tangible personal property upon or appurtenant to the mining property.

(4) Immediately following the assessment, the owner or operator of the assessed property shall be notified of the assessment by
certified mail. The assessor of the county in which the property is located shall also be immediately notified of the assessment
by certified mail.

2
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(5) Property assessed by the unitary method, which is not necessary to the conduct and does not contribute to the income of the
business as determined by the commission, shall be assessed separately by the local county assessor.
t:'."i
'1iil

(6)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), for calendar years beginning on or after January 1, 2009 and ending on or before
December 31, 2010, the method for determining the fair market value of an aircraft, aircraft type, or mobile flight equipment
assessed under this part is equal to:

(i) the value referenced in the Used Price for Avg Acft Wholesale column of the Airliner Price Guide by make, model,
series, and year of manufacture; minus

(ii) 20% of the value described in Subsection (6)(a)(i).

(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), for calendar years beginning on or after January 1, 2009 and ending on or before
December 1, 2010, the method for determining the fair market value of an aircraft not listed in the Airliner Price Guide is
equal to:

(i) the value references in the Average Wholesale column of the Aircraft Bluebook Price Digest by make, model, series,
and year of manufacture; minus

(ii) 20% of the value described in Subsection (6)(b)(i).

'.t

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 53; Laws 1989, c. 204, § 2; Laws 1990. c. 41, § 2; Laws 1991. c. 263, § 4; Laws 1995. c. 138, § I, eff. May
I, l 995: Laws 1997. c. 360. § IO, eff. Jan. I, 1997: Laws 2007. c. 119. § I, eff. April 30. 2007; Laws 2007, c. 306, § 55, eff.
April 30, 2007~ Laws 2009, c. 226. § 1. eff May 12, 2009; Laws 2009, c. 235. § 1. eff. May 12, 2009.

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-20 I, UT ST§ 59-2-20 I
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of nocumt'.nt
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§ 59-2-207. Statements for mines--Penalty for failure to file ... , UT ST § 59-2-207

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & A1mos)
Pait 2. Assessment of Property
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-207
§ 59-2-207. Statements for mines--Penalty for failure to file statement or

information--Assessment ,vithout statement--Penalty--Waiver, reduction,
or compromise of penalty--Extension of time for filing statement--Appeals
Currentness
( 1)(a) A person, or an officer or agent of that person, owning or operating property described in Subsection ( 1)(b) shall file with
the commission, on a form prescribed by the commission, a sworn statement on or before March 1 of each year:

(i) showing in detail all real property and tangible personal property located in the state that the person owns or operates; and

(ii) containing any other information the commission requires.

(b) Subsection ( 1)(a) applies to the following property:

(i) a mine;

(ii) a mining claim; or

(iii) a valuable mineral deposit, including lands containing coal or hydrocarbons.

(c)(i) The commission may allow an extension for filing the statement under Subsection ( 1)(a) for a time period not exceeding
30 days, unless the commission determines that extraordinary circumstances require a longer period of extension.

(ii) The commission shall grant a person, or an officer or agent of that person, an extension for filing the statement under
Subsection ( 1)(a) for a time period not exceeding 15 days if:

(A) a federal regulatory agency requires the taxpayer to file a statement that contains the same information as the
statement under Subsection ( 1)(a); and

(B) the person, or an officer or agent of that person, requests the commission to grant the extension.

.t

§ 59-2-207. Statements for mines--Penalty for failure to file ... , UT ST§ 59-2-207

(2) The commission shall assess and list the property described in Subsection (1 )(b) using the best information obtainable by
the commission if a person, or an officer or agent of that person, fails to file the statement required under Subsection ( 1)(a)
on or before the later of:

(a) March I; or

(b) if the commission allows an extension under Subsection (l)(c) for filing the statement, the day after the last day of the
extension period.

(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c}, the commission shall assess a person a penalty as provided in Subsection (3)
(b ), if the person, or an officer or agent of that person, fails to file:

(i) the statement required under Subsection ( 1)(a) on or before the later of:

(A} March I; or

(B) if the commission allows an extension under Subsection (1 )(c) for filing the statement, the day after the last day
of the extension period; or

.,
(ii) any other information the commission determines to be necessary to:

(A) establish valuations for assessment purposes; or

(B) apportion an assessment.

(b) The penalty described in Subsection (3)(a) is an amount equal to the greater of:

(i) 10% of the person's estimated tax liability under this chapter for the current calendar year not to exceed $50,000; or

(ii) $100.

(c)(i) Notwithstanding Subsections (3)(a) and (4), the commission may waive, reduce, or compromise a penalty imposed
under this section if the commission finds there are reasonable grounds for the waiver, reduction, or compromise.

(ii) If the commission waives, reduces, or compromises a penalty under Subsection (3)(c)(i), the commission shall make
a record of the grounds for waiving, reducing, or compromising the penalty.

(4) The county treasurer shall collect the penalty imposed under Subsection (3) as provided in Section 59-2-1308.

§ 59-2-207. Statements for mines--Penalty for failure to file ... , UT ST§ 59-2-207

(5) A person subject to a penalty under Subsection (3) may appeal the penalty according to the procedures and requirements
of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 59; Laws 1999. c. 71, § 3, eff. May 3. 1999: Laws 2008. c. 382, § 967, eff. May 5. 2008.

Notes of Decisions ( 1)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-207, UT ST§ 59-2-207
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of l)o('umtnt
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§ 59-2-301. Assessment by county assessor. UT ST § 59-2-301

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annos)
Pait 3. County Assessment
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-301
§ 59-2-301. Assessment by county assessor

Currentness
The county assessor shall assess all property located within the county which is not required by law to be assessed by the
commission.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 69.

Notes of Decisions {6)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-301, UT ST§ 59-2-301
Current through 2015 General Session .
•t

End of Document

§ 59-2-303. General duties of county assessor, UT ST § 59-2-303

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs &Almos)
Part 3. County Assessment
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-303
§ 59-2-303. General duties of county assessor

Currentness
( 1) Prior to May 22 each year, the county assessor shall ascertain the names of the owners of all property which is subject to
taxation by the county, and shall assess the property to the owner, claimant of record, or occupant in possession or control at 12
o'clock midnight of January 1 in the tax year, unless a subsequent conveyance of ownership of the real property was recorded
in the office of the county recorder more than 14 calendar days before the date of mailing of the tax notice. In that case, any
tax notice may be mailed, and the tax assessed, to the new owner. No mistake in the name or address of the owner or supposed
owner of property renders the assessment invalid.

(2) A county assessor shall become fully acquainted with all property in his county, as provided in Section 59-2-30 I.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 71; Laws 1993, c. 245, § I.

Notes of Decisions ( 8 ·,
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-303, UT ST§ 59-2-303
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of llorumrnt

.t

§ 59-2-310. Assessment in name of claimant as well as owner, UT ST§ 59-2-310

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annos)
Pait 3. County Assessment

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-310
§ 59-2-310. Assessment in name of claimant as well as owner

Currentness
Real property described on the assessment book need not be described a second time, but any person claiming the real property
and a desire to be assessed for the land may have the person's name inserted with that of the person to whom the real property
is assessed.

Credits
Laws 1987, c. 4, § 78.

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-310, UT ST§ 59-2-310
Current through 2015 General Session.
Eml ot' l)ornmrnt

§ 59-2-1308. Property assessed by commission--Collection ... , UT ST § 59-2-1308

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 13. Collection of Taxes (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1308
§ 59-2-1308. Property assessed by commission--Collection procedures--Exceptions

Currentness
(I) Property taxes assessed by the commission shall be collected, billed, and paid in the manner provided for the collection,
billing, and enforcement of other general property taxes under this chapter, except:

(a) the rolling stock ofrail car companies; and

(b) state-assessed commercial vehicles.

(2)(a) A county treasurer may require a taxpayer, other than a taxpayer described in Subsection ( I )(a) or (b), to pay an ad
valorem tax liability immediately if:
.t

(i) the taxpayer's property taxes are assessed by the commission under Section 59-2-20 I; and

(ii) the taxpayer gives any indication of:

(A) departing from the state;

(B) removing the taxpayer's property from the state; or

(C) doing any other act which may prejudice or hinder the collection process for any assessment period.

(b) Jfa tax is not paid as provided in this chapter, the county treasurer shall collect the tax:

(i) for personal property and uniform fees, in the same manner as is provided for the collection of delinquent taxes or
uniform fees under Sections 59-2-1302 and 59-2-1303; or

(ii) for all other property, including personal property and uniform fees listed with real property under Section 59-2-1302,
in the same manner as is provided for the collection of delinquent taxes under Section 59-2-133 l.

§ 59-2-1308. Property assessed by commission--Collection ... , UT ST§ 59~2-1308

(c) The provisions of Sections 59-2-1302 and 59-2-1303 apply to the assessment by the commission or the county assessor
of taxpayers other than a taxpayer described in Subsection (1 )(a) or (b).

Credits
Laws 1988,c.3,§ 165;Laws 1989,c.22,§38;Laws 1997,c.360.§ 19,eff.Jan.1, I997;Laws l997,c.379.§4,eff.Jan.1. 1998.

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1308, UT ST§ 59-2-1308
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of Document
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§ 59-2-1325. Nature and extent of lien--Time of..., UT ST§ 59-2-1325

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs & A1mos)
Pait 13. Collection ofTmces (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1325
§ 59-2-1325. Nature and extent oflien--Tirne of attachrnent--Effective date of boundary changes for assessment

Currentness
( I )(a) A tax upon real property is a lien against the property assessed.

(b) A tax due upon improvements upon real property assessed to a person other than the owner of the real property is a lien
upon the property and improvements.

(c) A lien described in Subsection (l)(a) or (b) shall attach on January I of each year.

(2) An assessment shall be collected in accordance with the effective date and boundary adjustment provisions in Subsection
17-2-209(4).

Credits
Laws 1988, c. 3, § 182; Laws 2010. c. 381, § 28, cff. f\fay 11, 20 I0.

Notes of Decisions ( 17)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1325, UT ST§ 59-2-1325
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of l)Ol'UJTH'nf

§ 59-2-1338. Record of delinquent taxes--Contents of record, UT ST§ 59-2-1338

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs &Annos)
Part 13. Collection of Taxes (Refs & A1mos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1338
§ 59-2-1338. Record of delinquent taxes--Contents of record

CmTentness
( 1) The treasurer shall prepare the official record of delinquent taxes in the same order as property appears on the assessment
rolls. The record shall show:

(a) the name of the person to whom the property is assessed;

(b) the description of the delinquent parcel, and a reference to the parcel, serial, or account number under which the property
was listed in the assessment roll;

(c) the amount of delinquent taxes, penalties, and administrative costs; and
.t

(d) the date ofredemption and by whom the property is redeemed.

(2) The record shall also provide space for entering delinquent taxes assessed in subsequent years against each parcel which
remains unredeemed.

(3) Taxes levied only on a certain kind or class of property for a special purpose shall be separately set out.

Credits
Laws 1988, c. 3, § 196; Laws 1995. c. 181, § 10. eff. May I, 1995.

U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1338, UT ST§ 59-2-1338
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of Oornment
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§ 59•2-1351.1. Tax sale--Combining certain parcels--Acceptable ... , UT ST§ 59-2-1351.1

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 59. Revenue and Taxation
Chapter 2. Property Tax Act (Refs &Annos)
Part 13. Collection of Taxes (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1351.1
§ 59-2-1351.1. Tax sale--Combining certain parcels--Acceptable bids--Deeds

Currentness
( I )(a) At the time specified in the notice the auditor shall:

(i) attend at the place appointed, offer for sale, and sell all real property for which an acceptable bid is made; and

(ii) refuse to offer a parcel ofreal property for sale if the description of the real property is so defective as to convey no title.

(b) The auditor may post at the place of sale a copy of the published list of real property to be offered and cry the sale by
reference to the list rather than crying each parcel separately.

(2)(a) The tax commission shall establish, by rule, minimum procedural standards applicable to tax sales.

.t

(b) For matters not addressed by commission rules, the county legislative body, upon recommendation by the county auditor,
shall establish procedures, by ordinance, for the sale of the delinquent property that best protect the financial interest of the
delinquent property owner and meet the needs of local governments to collect delinquent property taxes due.

(3) The county governing body may authorize the auditor to combine for sale two or more contiguous parcels owned by the
same party when:

(a) the parcels are a single economic or functional unit;

(b) the combined sale will best protect the financial interests of the delinquent property owner; and

(c) separate sales will reduce the economic value of the unit.

(4) The governing body may accept any of the following bids:

(a) the highest bid amount for the entire parcel of property, however, a bid may not be accepted for an amount which is
insufficient to pay the taxes, penalties, interest, and administrative costs; or

§ 59-2-1351.1. Tax sale--Combining certain parcels--Acceptable .•• , UT ST§ 59-2-1351.1

(b) a bid in an amount sufficient to pay the taxes, penalties, interest, and administrative costs, for less than the entire parcel.

(i) The bid which shall be accepted shall be the bid of the bidder who will pay in cash the full amount of the taxes, penalties,
interest, and administrative costs for the smallest portion of the entire parcel.

(ii) The county auditor at the tax sale or the county legislative body following the tax sale shall reject a bid to purchase a strip
of property around the entire perimeter of the parcel, or a bid to purchase a strip of the parcel which would prevent access
to the remainder of the parcel by the redemptive owner or otherwise unreasonably diminish the value of that remainder.

(iii) If the bid accepted is for less than the entire parcel, the auditor shall note the fact, with a description of the property

covered by the bid, upon the tax sale record and the balance of the parcel not affected by the bid shall be considered to
have been redeemed by the owner.

(5) The county legislative body may decide that none of the bids are acceptable.

(6) Once the county auditor has closed the sale of a particular parcel of property as a result ofaccepting a bid on the parcel, the
successful bidder or purchaser of the property may not unilaterally rescind the bid. The county legislative body, after acceptance
of a bid, may enforce the terms of the bid by obtaining a legal judgment against the purchaser in the amount of the bid, plus
interest and attorney's fees .
•t

(7) Any sale funds which are in excess of the amount required to satisfy the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and
administrative costs of the delinquent property shall be treated as unclaimed property under Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed
Property Act.

(8) All money received upon the sale of property made under this section shall be paid into the county treasury, and the treasurer
shall settle with the taxing entities as provided in Section 59-2-1366.

(9)(a) The county auditor shall, after acceptance by the county governing body, and in the name of the county, execute deeds
conveying in fee simple all property sold at the public sale to the purchaser and attest this with the auditor's seal. Deeds issued
by the county auditor under this section shall recite the following:

(i) the total amount of all the delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and administrative costs which were paid in for the

execution and delivery of the deed;

(ii) the year for which the property was assessed, the year the property became delinquent, and the year the property was
subject to tax sale;

(iii) a full description of the property; and

(iv) the name of the grantee.

'")
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(b) When the deed is executed and delivered by the auditor, it shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity ofall proceedings
subsequent to the date the taxes initially became delinquent and of the conveyance of the property to the grantee in fee simple.

(c) The deed issued by the county auditor under this section shall be recorded by the county recorder.

(d) The fee for the recording shall be included in the administrative costs of the sale.

(e) The deed shall be substantially in the following form:
TAX DEED
_ _ County, a body corporate and politic of the state of Utah, grantor, hereby conveys to _ _, grantee, of _ _ the following
described real estate in _ _ County, Utah:
(Here describe the property conveyed)
This conveyance is made in consideration of payment by the grantee of $_ _, representing the total amount owing for
delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and administrative costs constituting a charge against the real property for nonpayment of
general taxes assessed against it for the years _ _ through _ _ in the sum of$_ _.
Dated _ _ _(month\day\year).

.f

(Auditor's Seal)
County ........................................................................................................................................................................................... .

By .................................................................................................................................................................................................. .
County Auditor

Credits
Laws 1995. c. 181, § 20, eff. May I. 1995: Laws 1996. c. 79. § 75, eff. April 29, 1996: Laws 2000. c. 75. § 31, eff. May 1, 2000.

Notes of Decisions (38)
U.C.A. 1953 § 59-2-1351.1, UT ST§ 59-2-1351.1
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of Dornnu~ut

Tab 4

§ 40-1-12. Damages for wrongful removal of ores, UT ST§ 40-1-12

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 40. Mines and Mining
Chapter 1. Mining Claims (Refs & Annos)

U.C.A. 1953 § 40-1-12
§ 40-1-12. Damages for wrongful removal of ores

Currentness
When damages are claimed for the extraction or selling of ore from any mine or mining claim and the defendant, or those under
whom he claims, holds, under color of title adverse to the claims of the plaintiff, in good faith, then the reasonable value of all
labor bestowed or expenses incurred in necessary developing, mining, transporting, concentrating, selling or preparing said ore,
or its mineral content, for market, must be allowed as an offset against such damages; provided, however, that any person who,
wrongfully entering upon any mine or mining claim and carrying away ores therefrom, or wrongfully extracting and selling
ores from any mine, having knowledge of the existence of adverse claimants in any mine or mining claim, and without notice
to them, knowingly and willfully trespasses in or upon such mine or mining claim and extracts or sells ore therefrom shall be
liable to the owners of such ore for three times the value thereof without any deductions either for labor bestowed or expenses
incurred in removing, transporting, selling or preparing said ore, or its mineral content for market.

Credits
Laws 1937, c. 63, § 1.
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1536; C.L. 1907, § 1536; C.L. 1917, § 3938; R.S. 1933, § 55-1-12; C. 1943, § 55-1-12.

Notes of Decisions (2)
U.C.A. 1953 § 40-1-12, UT ST§ 40-1-12
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of Dot·ument
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING AND ORDER

James Harvey Jordan, Trustee of the James H.
Jordan Revocable Trust dated June 1, 2007,
Martha Jordan Boright, Mary Edna Jordan,
Michael C. Kelley, and Jary Anne Kelley,
Trustee of the Kelley Joint Trust dated
January 7, 2013, Gary E. Kelley, Norma
Stroud Dickey, Mara Beth Hamer, Jan
Rhodes as Trustee of the Revocable Rhodes
Family Living Trust dated April 19, 2005,
Wendy Sue Pack, Craig Mcsorley, Deborah J.
Bowers, Laura Ward, Mark McSorely,

Case No. 130800084

Judge SAMUEL P. CHIARA

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,

.t

vs.
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen,
Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs.

Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

vs.
Axia Energy, LLC, Stonegate Resources,
LCC, Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for

1

(.

Summary Judgment; the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment; and the Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court heard oral argument on the Motions on September 24, 2014. The Court has
thoroughly reviewed the arguments of counsel, the Motions, the supplemental pleadings, and the
relevant case law and statutes. This Ruling and Order will resolve all three of the pending
Motions for Summary Judgment.
Initially, the Court recognizes the passage of time in issuing this Ruling and Order.
Unfortunately, the necessary recusal of Judge Peterson, followed much later by the recusal of
Judge McClellan, as well as the difficulty of the issues, resulted in a longer delay than is typical.
The Court thanks the parties and counsel for their patience. The Court would also like to
recognize the exceptional quality of each party's_ argwnents and written briefs. The level of
professionalism all sides displayed was outstanding. The quality of the legal work is very high.
The arguments are well reasoned and thorough, which made the decision difficult, but also left
the Court confident the parties have accurately presented the full scope of the law dealing with
these issues.
Undisputed Material Facts
1.

The property that is the subject of this case consists of approximately 40 acres in
Randlett, Utah, legally described as the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of
Section 32, Township 7 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian.

2.

On October 25, 1954, Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson, and Caroline Kelley (the
"Jordans") acquired the property.

3.

The Jordans sold the property to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, reserving the oil, gas, and
2
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Vi/ii

mineral rights. The deed is dated February 3, 1995, and recorded March 15, 1995, at
Book 592, Page 95, in the Uintah County Recorder's Office.

4.

The real property tax notice for the 1995 taxes on the property was mailed by Uintah
County to Olivia Jordan c/o Jonathan Anthony Andrews, P.O. Box 5451, Gainsville, Fl.

32602.
5.

The 1995 taxes were not timely paid.

6.

The 1996 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, at P.O. Box 851981,
Richardson, Texas. Those taxes in the amount of $32.42 were paid on November 21,

1996.

7.

The 1997 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews at the Richardson, Texas
address. The 1997 taxes in the amount of $35.92 were paid on December 10, 1997.

8.

On November 17, 1997, $33.05 was paid on the 1995 taxes. "Aftet payment on penalties

and interest, there was a balance owing of $8.94.
9.

The 1998 and 1999 tax notices were sent to Johnathan Anthony Andrews at the
Richardson, Texas P.O. Box. The taxes for 1998 and 1999 were not paid.

"'

10.

For failing to pay the real property taxes assessed for the 1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years,
resulting in a past due amount of $167.19, Uintah County seized and sold the property on
May 25, 2000.

11.

The record of delinquent taxes prepared by the treasurer and recorded states that the date
of the tax lien is January 16, 19961, and date of delinquency is January 16, 1996.
1

All parties agree this date is incorrect, and likely due to a typographical error. The taxes
for the 1996 year were paid. The record should have indicated a tax lien date and delinquency
date of January 1, 1995, as there remained a balance due on the 1995 taxes.
3
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12.

..

The assessment and levy for the 1995 tax year did not occur until on or after May 12,

Q

1995.

13.

No notice was ever given to the Jordans of the assessment of 1995, the failure to pay the
tmces, or the tax sale.

14.

G

On May 25, 2000, Uintah County executed a tax deed concerning the property. The
grantee was Quality Remediation Services ("QRS"), who paid the County $6,000.00.

15.

On December 13, 2000, QRS executed a warranty deed concerning the property. The

Ci;.

Jensens were the grantees, and paid $5,500.00 to QRS.
16.

In a January 2001 Real Property Transfer Survey Standard Land Questionnaire the
~

Jensens indicated they paid fair market value for the property, and that the sale did not
include the mineral rights.
•t

17 .

Prior to March 2013, the Jensens never asserted a claim to own the mineral rights in the

(iJ

property.

18.

Since 1995, the Jordans have periodically leased the oil, gas, and mineral rights.

19.

In May 2011, Stonegate entered into oil and gas leases with the successors in interest to

@

the Jordans. In August of 2011, Stonegate assigned the working interest in these leases to

Axia, reserving for itself and Wasatch a royalty interest.
Q

20.

In November 2011, the Jensens entered into a Surface Use Agreement and Grant of
Easements, allowing Axia to conduct exploration and drilling operations on the property.

21.

Over time, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182 under the Surface Use Agreement.

22.

Axia paid all the taxes associated with the mineral rights in 2012 and 2013, totaling

GI

$84,878.32.
@
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Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v.

Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts and
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. America Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989).
The Motions concern competing claims to title of the oil, gas, and mineral estate. There
is no dispute of material fact. Therefore, the issue can be determined as a matter of law.

I. Whether Uintah County's 1995 general assessment included taxing the mineral interest?
I

•

The first issue is whether the Jordans' oil, gas, and mineral rights were severed from the
surface estate and not assessed or lev1ed on by Uintah County in 1995.
The Jordans2 argue that the mineral estate was reserved at the time of conveyance of the
surface rights to Mr. Andrews on February 3, 1995. The Uintah County Assessor assessed the
property on May 22, 1995. Consequently, the Jordans argue that the County Assessor did not
assess the mineral rights because the mineral estate had been severed by that time. Because the
County Assessor did not assess the mineral rights, the Jordans argue there was no levy.
The Jensens argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103 the 1995 tax assessment
occurred on January 1, 1995, before the February 3, 1995, severance. The Jensens argue that the

2

The Jordans and Axia argue for the same result, and largely offer the same arguments
and cite to the same case law in their separate Motions and separate replies. For clarity and
brevity, the Court will refer to the Jordans when discussing both the Jordans' and Axia's
arguments and positions.
5
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lien for the 1995 unpaid taxes attached as of January 1, 1995. As a consequence, the Jensens

argue that the mineral rights were levied and properly passed by tax deed at the 2000 tax sale.
"Tax sale proceedings are predicated and founded upon failure to pay a tax assessed
against the property, and, therefore, no validity can attach to any sale except of the property
assessed and delinquent for failure to pay the tax levied on the assessment as made.,, Tintic

Undine Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 14 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Utah 1938). "If property rights which
are not included in an assessment are sold or extinguishable by a tax sale, there would be a talcing
of property without due process of law." Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946). If
Uintah County did not assess the mineral estate, the mineral estate was not subject to the tax lien
and could not pass at a tax sale. Therefore, the date of assessment, and whether Uintah County
had the power to assess the mineral estate, are critical.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(a) states: "All tangible taxable property . . . shall be assessed
and taxed at a wrlform rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless
otherwise provided by law." Also, "[a] tax upon real property is a lien against the property
assessed ... [and] shall attach on January 1 of each year." Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-1325.
Notwithstanding, the issue of when the date of assessment and levy occurs has been
authoritatively decided in Utah. In Huntington Cityv. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974),
Huntington City bought a parcel ofland on April 7, 1959. The Emery County assessor assessed
the parcel ofland, and the levy for tax was made in August 1959. No notice of the tax
assessment was given to Huntington City. The party assessed the 1959 taxes did not pay the
taxes and the property was sold at a tax sale. The Utah Supreme Court quieted title to
Huntington City, holding that the assessment occurred after Huntington City acquired the
6
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property and that no tax lien attached as a consequence.
In Gillmor v. Dale, 15 P.932 (Utah 1904), the Utah Supreme Court held that a property
tax "does not become a lien on real estate until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied ..."
because "[t]he city council was not authorized ... to levy a tax, except on property within its
corporate limits, and any levy upon property not within such limits is without authority and
void." Id. at 934.
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake
City, 8S2 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1993), found:

The date of assessment and levy, not the statutory lien date of January 1st, is the
relevant date for determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity's
power for the purpose of assessing, levying and collecting taxes on the property.
See also H.C. Massey v. Griffiths, 153 P.3d 312, 110 (Utah 2007)("Assessment is the basis of the

tax title and only that interest which was properly assessed can be sold.")
The Jensens contend that Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-1325 and 59-2-103 dictate the lien
date as January 1, of the year the property was assessed. The Jensens also attempt to distinguish
the above line of cases by arguing that those cases merely apply to property transferred to a tax
exempt entity. The Jensens argue the reason for treating a tax exempt entity differently is a tax
exempt entity would have no reason to believe that they would be taxed. Therefore, selling a tax
exempt entity's property for failure to pay taxes would be improper.
The Jensens' argument that a tax lien attaches on January 1, regardless of the date of
assessment and levy, is not without support. The dissenting opinion in Huntington, 518 P.2d at
1249-50 (Henriod, J., dissenting), also insisted that a tax lien attaches on January 1 pursuant to
statute. While the dissenting opinion is well reasoned, the majority rejected it. This Court is
7

(~:;

required to follow binding precedent, which is the majority opinion.
Further, if the above line of cases only apply to tax exempt entities, that qualification was
not stated explicitly in the holdings, and the reasoning to treat tax exempt entities differently in
these scenarios was not explained. If the reason is, as the Jensens suggest, that tax exempt
entities would have no reason to suspect tax liability, the same reasoning would apply to the facts
here. The Jordans also had no reason to suspect a tax liability to the County because: (I) their
mineral interest was severed prior to taxation; (2) the mineral interest was non-productive; (3)
counties are not empowered to tax a severed mineral interest under the Constitution and the Act;
(4) Uintah County did not believe that they assessed these mineral interests in 1995; (S) the

Jordans had never had their mineral estate assessed separately prior to 1995;and (6) the Uintah
County Record of Delinquent Taxes showed the wrong lien date for the property. Based on these
factors, the Jordans would have had n~ reason to believe that their mineral interest-was taxed by
Uintah County for the 1995 year.
Because the property was not assessed by the Uintah County assessor until after the
February 3, 1995, severance date, the mineral estate was not assessed by the County. Uintah
County only assessed the surface rights. The tax lien did not attach to the mineral rights.
Consequently, authority and jurisdiction to sell the mineral rights were not acquired by the
County, and the mineral interests were not sold at the May 2000 tax sale.

II, Whether Uintah County had the authority to assess the severed mineral interest?
The Jordans argue Uintah County does not have the authority to separately assess, levy,
and seize mineral rights. The Jordans point to Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-201 and 59-5-102, et
8
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seq., which directs that counties tax the surface interest, and the Utah State Tax Commission
taxes the mineral interest. The Jordans also cite to case law which hold the same. See Telonis v.

Staley, 144 P.2d 513,515 (Utah 1943)("Where there is separate ownership of the respective
rights [referring to severed surface and mineral rights], separate levy and separate sale would
necess~ly follow...."); Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d
1139, 1140 (Utah 1975)(holding Utah State Tax Commission taxes mineral rights and counties
tax swface rights).
The Jensens argue Uintah County was required to tax the mineral interests as part of the
general assessment. The Jensens argue that "all tangible property in the State that is not exempt.
. . shall be" assessed and truced. Utah Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§ 59-2-301, cowities are required to assess all property not assessed by the Utah State
Tax Commission. The Jensens argue the Commission is obligated to assess only valuable·
mineral deposits. The Jensens argue that the mineral estate was not valuable until 2012 when the
mine started producing. Therefore, the Jensens argue Uintah County was required to assess the
mineral estate in 1995 when it was not valuable, or at least, had not had a value applied to it.
Admittedly, this is a difficult issue. On one hand, if it is true that the Commission is only
required to tax producing or valuable mineral interests, and counties are only authorized to tax
surface rights, then there is seemingly a gap left that allows unproductive mineral interests to go
untaxed. Although those unproductive mineral interests are not producing, in many instances
they perhaps have some undetermined value. On the other hand, if counties are required to tax
non-producing mineral interests, the practical problem of determining the value of an
unproductive mineral interest arises. Additionally, Uintah County does not attempt to determine
9
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a value or apply a tax rate to severed mineral interests. Neither does Uintah County send
separate tax bills, notices, or notices of sales to owners of severed mineral interests. Following
Jensen's reasoning, severed unproductive mineral interests have unknowingly passed at
numerous tax sales. Because Uintah County does not notify owners of severed mineral interests
of assessments or tax sales, it is likely that many owners of severed mineral interests find
themselves in an identical position to the Jordans. Finally, where surface and mineral interests
have been severed, such as is likely the case with hundreds or even thousands of parcels in
Uintah County, the county's general assessment results in only one tax bill even though there are
at least two owners. That tax bill is uniformly assessed to and paid by the surface owner. Would
mineral interest owners be liable to pay some portion of the tax where the mineral interest is
nonproductive and not otherwise taxed? How would the property owners divide the bill? What
would happen if one party paid the full arriount'ofthe bill?
The Court determines that undeveloped or undiscovered minerals underlying a piece of
property are akin to an intangible asset. As an intangible asset, the undiscovered minerals fall
outside the scope of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, and are not subject to
taxation. It follows that counties are not responsible for detennining the value of undeveloped or
undiscovered minerals and are not authorized or required to tax valueless property. The Jensens
provide no support for their argument that counties are responsible for taxing valueless property,
and the Court is not aware of any. Valueless property cannot be taxed. Applying a tax rate to
property that has either no market value or an undetennined market value is pointless because the
resulting tax obligation would be zero. Valuable mineral interests whose fair market value can
be detennined are required by statute and the Utah Constitution to be assessed by the Utah State
10
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Tax Commission. Therefore, Uintah County did not have the authority to assess the severed
mineral estate in 1995, as the mineral estate at that time was not producing, the minerals were
undiscovered, and the value of the mineral estate was unknown.

Ill. Whether the §tatute of limitations bars any challenge to the May 2000 tax deed, despite no
notice given to the Jordans?

If the mineral estate was properly assessed by Uintah County, and a tax lien attached, the
next question is whether the Jordans' constitutional challenge based on lack of notice is barred by
the statute of limitations for tax deeds.
The Jensens argue that any challenge to their purchase of the mineral estate at the May
2000 tax sale is barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-206 bars
any challenges to tax title after four years from the date of the sale. Section 206 states:
an action or defense to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or determine the
ownership of real property may not be commenced against the holder of a tax title
after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, conveyance, or transfer of
the tax title to any county, or directly to any other purchaser at any public or private
sale. This section may not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title
to the property which he or his predecessor actually occupied or possessed within
four years from the commencement of an action or defense....
The Jensens have held the May 2000 tax title beyond the four-year period set forth in Section
206. There is no argwnent that the Jordans did not actually possess the mineral estate at any time
during the four-year time period between May 2000, and May 2004.3

3

The Court notes here the inequality the statute would create for owners of legal title to
unproductive mineral estates, as they would never be able to show actual possession of an
unproductive mineral estate. While it's not necessary to the outcome here, the Court finds that
the Jordans exercised as much actual possession or control of the mineral estate as possible, by
periodically leasing the minerals over the many years following the tax sale.
11
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The parties have offered extensive case law on this issue from a variety of jurisdictions.
The Court has reviewed the cases cited in the Motions and supplemental pleadings and found
them useful for gaining a general understanding of the law on this issue. Reliance on only two of
the cases is necessary and sufficient for this decision. In Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006),
the U.S. Supreme Court found that selling a person's property at a tax sale without notice was a
violation of the person's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Court determined that
notice of the tax sale must be reasonably calculated to reach the intended person to be deemed
constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 226; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306,314 (1950). The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of application of the
tax title statute of limitations where the tax sale included a procedural error.

Frederiksen v.

LaF/eur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981). In Frederiksen, the Court upheld the application of the
statute.of limitations barring a challenge based on a procedural defect in the tax sale (the county
auditor's appointment was not made in writing, and had failed to take an oath of office, as
required by statute). The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute of limitations was to
provide certainness and finality to tax sales, even if the sale was invalid because of procedural
defects in the execution. Importantly for our purposes, however, is footnote 14 of the

Frederiksen opinion, in which Justice Oaks stated in dicta, "We expressly reserve opinion on
whether the special statute of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by means repugnant to
fundamental fairness or whether such an application of the statute would exceed the limits of
statutory intent or constitutional permissibility." Id. at 831, fn. 14.
Here, the Jordans were not given notice of the 1995 assessment or any assessment
thereafter. The Jordans were not listed on the assessment roll. Mr. Andrews was the only one
12
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given notice of the taxes levied after the severance. The general assessments made on the
Jordans' property prior to the 1995 severance never explicitly included an assessment for the
mineral estate. Neither the Jordans, nor their predecessors, were ever given notice of the May
2000 tax sale. Uintah Cowity had the addresses for the Jordans and their attorney. The County
had previously sent tax notices for years prior to 1995 to Olivia Jordan.
The Court finds that this is one particular instance that Justice Oaks alluded to where the
special statute oflimitations does not apply. One of the most critical and fundamental due
process rights is the right to notice, particularly when notice pertains to a government seizure of
property. A statute of limitations that eliminates a person's right to challenge a tax sale, even
when notice was not given, runs afoul of Constitutional protections. The facts here are not
similar to those in Frediksen, where the error in the tax sale involved a minor procedural issue.
The error here was substantive and significant. Consequentiy the' tax deed was not merely
voidable and subject to the statute of limitations, as the Jensens suggest. The tax deed is void
because the lack of notice to the Jordans is a jurisdictional defect of the sale. Without
jurisdiction, the statute of limitations did not start, let alone expire. Selling the Jordans' mineral
interest at a tax sale without notice was an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process.
The Court finds that selling property at a county tax sale without any notice to the legal owner of
the property is repugnant to fundamental fairness.
Further, record notice does not absolved the County of the problem. First, record notice
does not satisfy the requirements outlined in Jones v. Flowers. Second, the record notice showed
that the tax lien date was January 16, 1996, which all parties agree was a clerical error, but
nonetheless would not have given the Jordans accurate notice that their mineral interest may be
13
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in jeopardy of being sold. The County also admits that the Uintah County Assessor did not
assess the mineral rights in this case and did not believe he was required to do so. Therefore,
even if the Jordans had reviewed the record and inquired of the County concerning a potential
sale of their interest, the County would have affirmed that their property was not subject to the
tax sale. Finally, an actual inspection of the land during the time of the tax sale or four years
after would not have given the Jordans any indication that their mineral interest had been sold at
a tax sale. There was no development on the overlying surface property, nor was there any
physical evidence of production of the mineral interest.
Because there was no actual notice of the tax sale, record notice was insufficient and
inaccurate, and because there was no physical evidence to suggest to the Jordans that the property
might have been sold, the Court finds that the sale was repugnant to fundamental fairness. The
sale, if intended to convey the severed mineral interests, was without due process of law, and
resulted in an unconstitutional taking. Consequently, pursuant to Frederiksen footnote 14, the
statute of limitations does not apply to bar the Jordans' challenge to the tax sale.

IV. Whether the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley have standing to assert the due
process claims?
Finally, the Jensens argue that the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley lack
standing to assert the due process rights. Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley passed away in
2003 and 2002, respectively. Ms. Robertson's and Ms. Kelley's heirs are some of the Plaintiffs
claiming and interest in the property.
''[I]n Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a jurisdictional requirement." Brown v.

r:·1
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])iv. of Water Rights ofDep 't ofNatural Res., 2010 UT 14,, 12,228 P.3d 747. "As a general
rule, courts do not permit a party to assert the constitutional rights of a third party." Shelledy v.

Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1992). "[A] litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests,
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Id.
However, "it has long been recognized that the surviving claims of a decedent must be
pursued by a third party." Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711 (1987). "[P]ermitting appellees to
raise their decedent's claims is merely an extension of the common law's provision for
appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 'settled practice of the courts' not
open to objection on the ground that it permits a litigant to raise third parties' rights.'' Id. at 712.
There are "two factors to be considered in detennining when the third-party rule should
be suspended: the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert, and the
ability of the third party.to assert his own right." Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, ~18 (8 th Cir.
1985). In Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp 2d 142, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court explained:
[m]oreover, as other courts have observed, the relationship between a parent and
child is much closer than those involved in other cases in which third-party standing
has been found to exist ... [t]he relationship between parent and child has been
deemed to be "more than sufficient to address the concerns that underlie the
prudential doctrine" of third-party standing. Elias v. United States Dep 't ofState,
721 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (N.D.Cal. 1989). Other courts have pennitted a child to
assert his or her parent's equal protection rights in challenging the validity of statutes
that conferred United States citizenship on the foreign-born offspring of United
States citizen fathers, but not United States citizen mothers, see Wauchope v. United
States Dep 't ofState, 985 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9 th Cir. 1993); Elisa, 121 F. Supp. at 24647, or which chilled the parent's rightto adopt a child, see Lindley ex rel. Lindley v.
Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 129 (7th Cir. 1989) ... Further, the effectiveness ofa parent's
representation of his or her child is reflected in the well-established tradition that
permits parents to sue as the representatives of their minor children and to "maintain
litigation that rests directly on the standing of the children themselves." 13 Wright
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531.9 (2d ed. 1984); see
also, e.g., Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21,980 F.2d 437,441 (7 th Cir.
15

1992).
Here, Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley are deceased and cannot pursue their constitutional
claims. As set forth above, they did not receive notice, and were not aware of their potential
constitutional claims before they died. Because they did not receive notice, they were not able to
pursue their constitutional claims before their deaths. The Plaintiffs, as heirs of Marie Robertson
and Caroline Kelley, also did not receive notice of the assessment, taxes, or sale.
As in Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. 0/State, 756 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1991), it is

"undisputed Plaintiffs' interests are hannonious with and at least as strong as the interest that
(their) mother would have asserted." The Plaintiffs, as children of Marie Robertson and Caroline
Kelley, have a sufficiently close relationship to satisfy the relationship factor in the third-party
standing test. The Court· finds that the Plaintiffs have third-party standing to assert the
.t

constitutional claims.

V. Whether Portion§ ofRolene Rasmussen's Affidavit should be Stricken?
In a separate motion, but in conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Jensens moved the court to strike certain portions ofRolene Rasmussen's testimony contained in
an affidavit. Jensens argue that the offending portions of the affidavit are legal conclusions not
based upon personal knowledge, rather than statements of fact. The particular paragraphs
complained of read as follows:
6. The Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral rights. Mineral rights are
handled by the Utah State Tax Commission.
7. The mineral rights on the Property would not have been included in and would not
16
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have been part of the Uintah County assessment of the Property in 1995 or any years thereafter.
9. Mineral rights are not included in any appraisal of real property by the Uintah County
Appraiser's office since the mineral rights are not assessed by the county.
The Court finds that the statements can be read either as statements of fact or as legal
conclusions. The statement that the Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral
rights can be taken as a statement of fact if Rasmussen has knowledge that the office makes no
attempt to value or assess mineral rights. Further, if Rasmussen knows that the office doesn't
separately assess mineral rights that have been severed from surface rights, such is a statement of

fact. Finally, if Rasmussen knows that appraisers in Uintah County don't attempt to value
minerals when perfonning appraisals for assessment purposes, such is a statement of fact. The
Court accepts Rasmussen's statement to establish these facts.

_.,

To the extent that Rasmussen's statement attempts to reach the ultimate legal conclusions
in this case, the Court disregards Rasmussen's statement for that purpose.

The Jordans' and Axia's Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. The Jensen's
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Court quiets title to the mineral interest in the
Jordans. Pursuant to Code v. Utah Dept. ofHealth, 162 P.3d 1097 (Utah 2007), and Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(t)(2), the parties are notified that this is the final ruling and order in this case. The parties
need not prepare or submit any other order.
Dated this

fl

[;_b0
____,2015.

day of _ _
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SAMUEL P. CHIARA, District Court Judge
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Tax Lien Attaches under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1325
Jordans' Predecessors Convey Surface Estate to Jon Andrews
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November 1996

1996 Taxes Paid

November 1997

Andrews Pays 1997 Taxes and a Portion of 1995 Taxes
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1998

Property Taxes Not Paid

1999

Property Taxes Not Paid

May 25, 2000
December 13, 2000
2001

Property Sold at Tax Sale to QRS for 1995, 1998, and 1999 Taxes
QRS Conveys Property by Warranty Deed to the Jensens
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2003
2004
May 25, 2004

~

. Ch~!lenge to Tax Sale Barred

2005
2006
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2007
2008
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2009
2010
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2011
2012
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2002

November 23, 2012

Axia Begins Oil Production from Property

July 3, 2013

Jordans Bring Claim Challenging Tax Sale

